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This is a study of the political argumentation in the German Baroque writer Hans 
Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen’s picaresque novel Der abenteuerliche 
Simplicissimus Teutsch (1668).  This thesis argues that the novel contains the three-part 
political argument found in the contemporary political treatises of Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan (1651) and John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1689).  The three-
part argument asks what is the state of nature, what is the natural man, and what is the 
just political system that emerges from these definitions.  Simplicissimus demonstrates 
political argumentation that refutes Hobbes’ defense of absolutism and anticipates 
Locke’s liberal political philosophy, while championing the moral hermit’s life above all 
political systems.  The substantial political argumentation in the novel is presented as a 
series of distopian and utopian worldviews encountered by the protagonist.  This thesis 
also presents a new interpretation both of the novel’s structure and of the novel’s 
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Hans Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen’s (1621-1676) picaresque novel Der 
abenteurerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch (1668) appeared between two seminal works in 
the canon of modern political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) Leviathan 
(1651) and John Locke’s (1632-1704) Second Treatise of Government (1689).1   Like 
these treatises on political science, the novel also attempts to answer the three-part 
political question that Hobbes and Locke engage in their treatises: what is the state of 
nature, who is the natural man in it, and what is the political system that emerges from 
this state under a social contract.  As Dieter Breuer attests in his article 
“Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation,” Grimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus 
contains political argumentation over the course of its five books.  Breuer sees 
Grimmelshausen’s political argumentation as “Skepsis gegenüber der Moralität der 
absolutistischen Staatsordnung” (Breuer 324).  But the novel’s political insight is deeper 
than a simple rejection of the absolute monarchy championed by Hobbes.  My research 
shows that the novel occupies a halfway point between Hobbes and Locke, rejecting the 
Hobbesian absolutism framework and anticipating the Lockeian liberal framework.  As a 
literary work appearing between these two political treatises, Simplicissimus arrives at the 
striking conclusion that the previous attempts at structuring society in order to meld 
Christian morality successfully with what Machiavelli describes as mankind’s natural 
“desire to acquire” have all failed (Machiavelli 14).  Grimmelshausen’s solution is that 
man must live a solitary life to lead a truly moral life.  Thus, Simplicissimus prescribes a 
                                                
1 Hans J. C. von Grimmelshausen, Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus (Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam, 2005).  This is a reprint of the first edition (1668). All further references are to 
this edition and will be made parenthetically in the text. 
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system of government that eliminates all forms of civil society tried to date, claiming that 
man is better off in the state of nature than in civil society.  This conclusion indicates that 
a new system of government is needed, the same conclusion that Locke will come to and 
address in the Second Treatise on Government twenty-one years later.   
Political argumentation permeates the novel and its presence has ramifications for 
the interpretation of the novel’s structure and frontispiece, two active areas of research 
concerning Grimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus.  This thesis demonstrates that the 
protagonist encounters and learns from a series of distopian and utopian worldviews in 
the second half of the novel that inform his political decisions.  According to this model, 
first half of the novel can been interpreted as Simplicissimus’ familiarization with the 
immoral and warring society of the Thirty Years’ War and the political system of 
absolutism, while the novel’s second half, in which he encounters the distopian and 
utopian worldviews, can be interpreted as his search for alternative political systems to 
map onto German-speaking territories to relieve them of their ills.  The novel’s political 
solution, which champions the hermit’s life and the solitary individual, also has 
ramifications for the interpretation of the frontispiece.  Grimmelshausen focuses on the 
morality and happiness of the individual Simplicissimus, who returns to the state of 
nature, and on the happiness of the individual reader, who according to the frontispiece 
should achieve “Rhue” after reading the novel (6).  Grimmelshausen’s immediate 
political concern is the happiness of the individual, because a system of government that 
can provide peace and happiness to society is not yet been reached. 
To illustrate Simplicissimus’ thorough and progressive political argumentation  
and its affect on the interpretation of the novel, it is imperative first to explore 
Grimmelshausen’s political background and the extent of his knowledge of contemporary 
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political philosophy.  This thesis then defines the three-part structure of the political 
argument in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the state of nature, the state of 
natural man and the subsequent prescription of a system of government.   Upon close 
investigation, it becomes clear that Simplicissimus’ rendering of these three parts of the 
political argument reacts to Hobbes and anticipates Locke.  A close examination of the 
relationship of Simplicissimus to Locke’s work demonstrates that the novel does not 
simply contain the aspects of a political argument, but instead, that it posits a substantial 
and progressive political argumentation that functions as a bridge between Hobbes and 
Locke.  This thesis then examines Grimmelshausen’s thorough investigation of the 
dominant political philosophy of his age as presented in the second half of the novel in a 
series of distopian and utopian worldviews that Simplicissimus encounters.  Finally, I 
discuss the ramifications of these findings for the interpretation of the novel’s structure 
and frontispiece.  Based on Grimmelshausen’s political argumentation, a new structural 
scheme emerges that advances previous scholarly structural interpretations of the novel.  
A new reading of the frontispiece of Simplicissimus frontispiece comparing it to that of 
Leviathan frontispiece also reveals that Grimmelshausen’s political message permeates 
the entire work, including the engraved title page.  
The implications of this thesis for the interpretation of Simplicissimus are 
substantial.  Grimmelshausen scholarship to date has focused on societal critique in the 
novel, but has not recognized Grimmelshausen’s prescriptive and progressive political 
argumentation.  He does not simply satirize the society of the Thirty Years’ War, but 
rather tries to find alternatives to it, much in the same manner as his contemporary 
political philosophers. Grimmelshausen’s political insights are remarkable because they 
anticipate the new political paradigms of John Locke, whose arguments lead to the 
  4 
emergence of the liberal political framework that served as the basis for the founding of 
the United States of America and the dominant structure of many other political entities 
today.  Grimmelshausen’s insights concerning the state of nature and the natural man 
would have been significant if he had been a political philosopher, and the fact that they 
are contained in a work of fiction is even more noteworthy.  Thus, the novel 
Simplicissimus can be read as a political treatise with striking insights on the state of 
nature, the natural man, and the advocation of a just system of government that bridges 
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CHAPTER I.  GRIMMELSHAUSEN’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Hans Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen (1621-1676) was well read, his 
writings reflect his knowledge of the contemporary political philosophy of his time, and 
he was even active in politics himself.  Nevertheless, the extent of his understanding of 
political science is unknown.  It is uncertain whether he was directly familiar with the 
works of Thomas Hobbes, including Leviathan (1651) and its defense of absolutism, 
against which his political argumentation argues.  Grimmelshausen’s main studies and 
active period of writing occurred after the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), and this was 
most likely the time in which Grimmelshausen could have been exposed to works 
political philosophy.  Breuer explains Grimmelshausen’s studies and writing after the 
war:  
 
Doch liegt die Kriegszeit immerhin siebzehn Jahre zurück, als sein erstes 
Buch erscheint.  Er schreibt seine Erzählwerke nicht als Soldat, auch nicht 
als Regimentssekretär, sondern viel später in Friedenszeiten neben den 
täglichen amtlichen Korrespondenzen, Visitationen, Geschäftsreisen, 
Abrechnungen.  Bevor er überhaupt an eigene Produktion denken konnte, 
mußte er als Autodidakt unter widrigsten Umständen dass in der Schule 
Versäumte nachholen – lesen, lesen, lesen  (Breuer, Handbuch 16).   
 
 
It is doubtful that Grimmelshausen read Hobbes during this time, as the Latin version of 
Leviathan, the first version that Grimmelshausen could have read by using the Latin from 
his interrupted school days, appeared first in 1668, the same year that Simplicissimus was 
published.  A survey of Willi Heining’s dissertation, Die Bildung Grimmelshausens 
(1965), records all the then known works that were in Grimmelshausen’s possession, and 
does not show him to have owned a copy of Hobbes’ Leviathan (Heining).  However, 
Grimmelshausen was familiar with political reference works that most likely included the 
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philosophy of Hobbes.  Breuer summarizes the current knowledge of Grimmelshausen’s 
awareness of political argumentations of his time in the following manner: 
 
Methodische Schwierigkeiten ergeben sich daraus, daß die Quellenfrage 
unter dem Aspekt der politischen Argumentation im einzelnen noch nicht 
genügend geklärt ist und auch im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung nicht 
geklärt werden kann.  Schon jetzt möglich indes ist eine vergleichende 
Lektüre von staatstheoretischen und staatsrechtlichen Lehrbüchern sowie 
historisch-politischen Nachschlagewerken der Zeit, auch solcher, die 
Grimmelshausen nachweislich benutzt hat  (Breuer, “Grimmelshausens 
Politische Argumentation” 307). 
 
 
According to Breuer, two of the contemporary reference works with which 
Grimmelshausen was familiar were Georg Hornius’ Orbis Politicus: Oder Beschreibung 
Aller Käiserthum, Königreiche, Fürstenthümer und Republiquen so heute zu Tag in der 
Welt bekant (1669) and Adam Contzen’s Politicorum libri decem in quibus de perfectae 
[…] Bibliopolae Coloniensis (1620).  Andrea Wicke establishes that Grimmelshausen 
would have also been able to gain access to political texts through private collections and 
libraries to which he would have had access, including: “Die Bestände des Klosters 
Allerheiligen, eine Buchsammlung von Dr. Johannes Küffer auf der Ullenburg [und] die 
Bibliothek der Freiherren von Schauenburg” (Wicke 298).  Grimmelshausen may also 
have come into contact with Hobbesian political philosophy through his preparation of a 
manuscript titled Teutscher Friedensraht (1655), by Claus von Schauenburg, for the 
printing press (Wicke 297).   Walther Ernst Schäfer thinks that through his contact with 
the Teutscher Friedensraht manuscript, Grimmelshausen may have “die Konzeptionen 
eines gemäßigten, durch ständische Elemente eingeschränkten und biblische begründeten 
Absolutismus kennengelernt” (Schäfer 138).   
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Finally, Grimmelshausen was active in politics and served as the steward in the 
Ullenburg castle near Strasbourg and as the mayor of Renchen, a small town in present-
day Baden-Württemberg (Otto 2-3).  Through these positions he knew noblemen from 
whom he could have learned about political philosophy.  Andrea Wicke finds that these 
relationships may have shaped Grimmelshausen’s political positions more than his role as 
a public official: “Ich halte die Bedeutung informeller persönlicher Beziehungen [mit 
mindermächtigen Adlige] für Grimmelshausen und seinen politischen Standort für größer 
als die seiner formalen Rolle als Verwaltungsbeamter der Straßburger Regierung” (Wicke 
300).  Grimmelshausen was politically well informed through his extensive reading, his 
civic duties, and his contact with nobility, which explains the strikingly insightful and 
progressive political argumentation in Simplicissimus.  
While the exact source of Grimmelshausen’s knowledge of Hobbes’ philosophy, 
or a similar defense of absolutism cannot be confirmed, Breuer identifies in 
Simplicissimus Hobbesian ideas, such as the “state of nature” and the “war of all against 
all.” These concepts are present in the novel and point to the fact that Grimmelshausen 
was probably familiar with the philosophy of Hobbes:  “Der Traum [“Traum vom 
Ständebaum” Grimmelshausen 59-68] veranschaulicht den…Zustand…des Krieges aller 
gegen alle” (Breuer 325).  Breuer also demonstrates that Grimmelshausen was familiar 
with writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), as indicated by his 
“antimachiavellistischen Traktats über Staatsräson eines theologisch legitimierten 
‘Politischen Regiments’ (Simplicianischer Zweyköpfiger Ratio Status, 1670).” Breuer 
therefore sees the author as an active critic and student of modern political philosophy 
(Breuer, “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation,” 304).    
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Through his knowledge of political philosophy Grimmelshausen placed in 
Simplicissimus much of the fundamental structure of the political argumentation that 
Hobbes’ Leviathan brought to the field of political science.  The structure of the political 
treatise in Leviathan laid the groundwork for examining man and nature and for 
prescribing a system of government.  Locke later used this structure to build his own 
political discourse, refuting Hobbes’ prescriptions.  Since the structure of Hobbes’ 
political treatise appears as literary discourse in Simplicissimus, Grimmelshausen must 
have been familiar enough with political argumentation to map the main aspects of it 
successfully onto a work of literature.  Not only is the Hobbesian structure present in the 
novel, but Grimmelshausen also seems to have had a sufficiently sophisticated 
knowledge of Hobbes’ main points to refute them.  
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CHAPTER II.  GRIMMELSHAUSEN, HOBBES, AND LOCKE 
 
 
1. THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 
 
 
In the introduction to Locke’s Second Treatise the political scientist C. B. 
Macpherson eloquently summarizes the structure of the political argument of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which both Leviathan and the Second Treatise of 
Government share, and which is also represented in Simplicissimus.   
 
Every political theory which sets out to justify or advocate a particular 
system of government, or a limited or unlimited degree of obligation of 
the citizen to the state, must rest on an explicit or implicit theory of human 
nature.  The theorist must show, or assume that the human beings who will 
have to submit to and operate the desired system do need it and are 
capable of running it.  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this was 
often done by postulating a supposed natural condition of mankind, or 
“state of nature,” from which men had historically or would necessarily 
move by some sort of agreement into political or civil society 
(Macpherson, “Introduction,” x). 
  
 
The movement from the state of nature into political or civil society by means of a social 
contract is the structure of the political treatise that Hobbes sets forth in Leviathan as well 
as that which Locke uses to build his arguments in the Second Treatise.  Their theories of 
the state of nature, natural man, and their justification for specific systems of government 
vary, but each part of the theory is present in their works, and, as will be demonstrated 
below, they are also present in Simplicissimus.  By looking at each of these three 
components—the state of nature, natural man, and the justification for a system of 
government in the three works—the position of Simplicissimus as a transitional treatise 
between Hobbes and Locke becomes clear.   
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1. A. Part One of the Political Argument:  The State of Nature 
 
 
In Leviathan Hobbes presents a state of nature that he describes as a “warre of 
every man against every man” (188):  
 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man 
is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men 
live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own 
invention shall furnish them withall.  In such condition, there is no place 
for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain (Hobbes 186).  
 
 
Hobbes understands the state of nature as a fearful and uncertain condition in which 
people of roughly the same strength battle each other for scarce resources.  The struggle 
is futile because no one man is so much stronger than another that he can lead a safe 
existence.  According to Hobbes, the natural men in the state of nature emerge from this 
condition by entering into a social contract with their peers to gain the security of civil 
society in exchange for giving up some of their liberty to a sovereign leader who 
possesses absolute power.   
 Grimmelshausen’s novel also depicts a Hobbesian state of “war of all 
against all,” but, in contrast, places violent conflict outside of the state of nature into 
society itself.  Breuer sees this as a critique of the absolute state as advocated by Hobbes 
by pointing out that Grimmelshausen places customs of the absolutistic society, such as 
determining rank by birth, among the unreasonable aspects of the social world:   
 
Der politische Diskurs des ersten Buches ist als ‘Traum vom Ständebaum’ 
bekannt.  Mit Blick auf die zeitgenössische Staatstheorie gelesen, erweist 
sich dieser Diskurs als Ausgangsbasis für die dann folgenden 
Ordnungsüberlegungen:  er führt die menschliche Sozietät in ihrem 
Naturstand vor.  Der Traum veranschaulicht den vernunftwidrigen, weil 
affektgetriebenen Zustand des homo homini lupus, des Krieges aller gegen 
alle.  Wie die frühabsolutistischen Staatstheoretiker, etwa Contzen oder 
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Hobbes, geht auch Grimmelshausen von einem vernunftwidrigen 
gesellschaftlichen Zustand des Menschen aus.  Er verschärft diese Position 
des homo homini lupus (Hobbes), des homo animal morosum, mutabile, 
versutum, tectum, pervicax (Contzen) jedoch noch dadurch, daß er die 
vorgefundene ständische Gliederung, d.h. die vorgefundene 
geburtsmäßige Ungleichheit, Adel und Nobilistensucht, unter die 




According to Breuer, the political discourse presented in the “Traum vom Ständebaum” 
(Grimmelshausen 59-68) is a version of Hobbes’ war of all against all, showing people 
trying to climb the social ladder as in a futile war with each other, like the people in the 
state of nature in permanent combat.  This presentation of the war of all against all shows 
that the governmental system that was supposed to distance people from the state of war 
did not accomplish its goal – the state of war has continued in society.  As Breuer argues, 
the novel criticizes absolutism and Grimmelshausen accomplishes this by reversing the 
locations of Hobbes’ state of nature and society in regard to war.  In Simplicissimus, the 
state of nature is more peaceful than society.  When at the end of the novel 
Simplicissimus decides to return to the woods to live the life of a hermit, he leaves a state 
of war (society) for a state of peace (the state of nature).  The novel thus turns Hobbes’ 
political theory on its head, with a clear critique of the absolute state. 
In Simplicissimus, a more complicated state of nature emerges, however.  The 
first instance of a state of nature in the novel is the episode in which Simplicissimus lives 
in harmony with the hermit in the woods after his Knan’s farm had been sacked.  
Simplicissimus’ life in the woods is a time of peace, spiritual learning, and hard work 
with the help and guidance of the hermit.  Simplicissimus describes the meager food they 
eat, the few tools that they own to survive, and their relationship to God:  “Und unter 
allen diesen Geschäften ließe der Einsiedel nicht ab, mich in allem Guten getreulichst zu 
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unterweisen; unterdessen lernete ich in solchem harten Leben Hunger, Durst, Hitz, Kälte 
und große Arbeit überstehen, und zuvorderst auch Gott erkennen, und wie man ihm 
rechtschaffen dienen sollte, welches das vornehmste war” (Grimmelshausen 46).  
Simplicissimus does not describe a Hobbesian state of nature here; there is no war of all 
against all, but rather cooperation between the hermit and Simplicissimus, who work very 
hard to survive.  There is also a religious aspect here that is missing in Hobbes’ state of 
nature.  This period serves as a formative time for Simplicissimus, and its importance is 
further supported by his resolution at the end of the novel to leave society and return to 
this way of life and become “wieder ein Einsiedel” (Grimmelshausen 571).  After having 
visited all strata of society and having experienced much in the world, Simplicissimus 
decides in the end that the best place for him is outside of society in the state of nature 
that formed the most basic foundation of his identity and morality.  In contrast to the 
warlike state of nature in Hobbes, which is not a place to return to but rather to avoid at 
all costs, the novel presents the state of nature as a place of hard work and peace, and 
suggests it as a viable place to return to and live.   
However, the forest is not a pastoral paradise, but rather poses some danger to 
Simplicissimus.  After the death of the hermit, Simplicissimus ventures into the town 
where they attended church, only to find it burned to the ground.  Upon seeing this, 
Simplicissimus returns to the woods, vowing never to leave again.  Returning to the 
supposed safety of the woods, he is confronted outside his woodland hut by the very 
soldiers who plundered the city:  “zu meinem Aufenthalt, im Feuer briete, umringten 
mich bei 40 oder 50 Musketier; diese, ob sie zwar ob meiner Person Seltsamkeit 
erstauneten, so durchstürmten sie doch meine Hütten, und suchten, was da nicht zu finden 
war” (Grimmelshausen 54).  The soldiers rummage through Simplicissimus’ hut and, if 
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he had had anything worth stealing, it would have been stolen from him.  Reflecting the 
harsh reality of the Thirty Years’ War, this scene shows that isolation in the woods, the 
state of nature presented in the novel, is neither a completely safe or exceptionally 
dangerous place for Simplicissimus.   
By depicting the dangers as well as the safety of the hermit’s life, the novel 
touches on some of the aspects of the state of nature that Locke describes in the Second 
Treatise.  Locke’s state of nature, like Simplicissimus’ harsh but otherwise safe isolation 
in nature, is not a “war of all against all,” but rather a place of difficult labor and some 
danger.  Macpherson summarizes Locke’s state of nature in the introduction the Second 
Treatise:  
 
[the law of nature] forbids anyone harming another or destroying himself, 
and requires each to try ‘when his own preservation come not in 
competition’ to preserve the rest of mankind (§§4-6). This law of nature 
would be generally observed, but there would be some transgressors; 
hence some power to restrain them would be needed; and since there was 
no government, that power must be left to every man individually (§7), but 
only as much power as is necessary “for reparation and restraint” (§8).  
Locke assumes that there are few offenders: he sums up this picture of the 
state of nature by calling it ‘a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance 
and preservation’ where men live together according to reason, and 
contrasting it sharply with a ‘state of war’, which is described as ‘a state of 
enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction.’ (§19)  (Macpherson, 
“Introduction” xiii-xiv). 2 
 
 
Locke’s description of the state of nature is quite similar to the state of nature in 
Simplicissimus in which the hermit and the boy live.  There is “mutual assistance” 
between the two, and they attempt to “preserve” themselves and not harm others.  Locke 
expands on this view of the state of nature, and therewith explains why man would want 
                                                
2 The symbol § refers to the 243 small sections of Locke’s Second Treatise, which are marked with this 
symbol. 
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to leave it.  The “transgressors” of the law of nature, like the musketeers in 
Simplicissimus, can cause problems for the law-abiding inhabitants of the state of nature.  
Macpherson summarizes:  
 
[Locke] asserted that one great reason for men quitting the state of nature 
was that in it ‘every the least difference’ is apt to end in the state of war; 
and later (in §123), when he had to explain why men would ever leave 
such a free and equal condition as the state of nature, the reason he gave 
was that in it each was ‘constantly exposed to the invasion of others’ 
(Macpherson, “Introduction” xiv). 
 
 
Locke’s prediction that the state of nature can deteriorate into a state of war and that the 
transgressors will make it unsafe resonates with the state of nature as depicted in 
Simplicissimus where peace usually reigns, but transgressors of natural law can also 
abound.   
 
1. B. Part Two of the Political Argument: Natural Man 
 
 
 Beyond the complex state of nature that the novel provides, 
Simplicissimus also describes the natural man, who inhabits the state of nature, and 
thereby the novel provides a sketch of human nature.  In Simplicissimus human nature 
has two contradictory parts which are both manifested in the character Simplicissimus.   
The first is what Machiavelli describes as the “desire to acquire,” and the second is a 
Christian capacity for love and kindness (Machiavelli 14).  In chapter three, “Of Mixed 
Principalities,” of The Prince (1532), Machiavelli writes about conquering other nations 
and what a prince should do to hold them properly.  In this historic argument, 
Machiavelli attests that it is human nature to want to expand and increase one’s wealth:  
“And truly it is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when 
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men do it who can, they will be praised or not blamed” (Machiavelli 14).  Machiavelli’s 
idea of the “desire to acquire” ushers in an new and influential view of human nature that 
is absorbed by Hobbes, Simplicissimus, and Locke.   
Hobbes refines the argument of human nature in Leviathan:  “I put for a generall 
inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that 
ceaseth onely in Death” (Hobbes 161).  Hobbes describes this “general inclination” as 
true for every person, including kings, who seem to have everything, yet still desire more 
land.  In Simplicissimus, a similar form of human nature is described at the beginning of 
the novel and permeates the story: 
 
Es eröffnet sich zu dieser unsere Zeit (von welcher man glaubt, daß es die 
letzte seie) unter geringen Leuten eine Sucht, in deren die Patienten, wann 
sie daran krank liegen und so viel zusammengeraspelt und erschachert 
haben, daß sie neben ein paar Hellern im Beutel ein närrisches Kleid auf 
die neue Mode, mit tausenderlei seidenen Banden, antragen können, oder 
sonst etwan durch Glücksfall mannhaft und bekannt worden, gleich 
rittermäßige Herren und adeliche Personen von uraltem Geschlecht sein 
wollen; da sich doch oft befindet, daß ihre Voreltern Taglöhner, 
Karchelzieher und Lastträger: ihre Vettern Eseltreiber: ihre Brüder Büttel 
und Schergen: ihre Schwestern Huren: Ihre Mütter Kupplerin, oder gar 
Hexen: und in Summa, ihr ganzes Geschlecht von allen 32 Anichen her, 
also besudelt und befleckt gewesen, als des Zuckerbastels Zunft zu Prag 
immer sein mögen; ja sie, diese neue Nobilisten, seind oft selbst so 




This picture of the “neue Nobilisten,” the new members of the nobility, who have clawed 
their way into new positions of power is presented as a “Sucht,” an addiction or ailment, 
of those people who want to show off their new power with expensive clothing although 
they really are not of noble lineage.  The novel presents this inclination as a diseased way 
of life for this group.  Nevertheless, the author then immediately proceeds to allow his 
main character to dream and speculate about his own possible noble birth.  “Solchen 
  16 
närrischen Leuten nun mag ich mich nicht gleichstellen, ob zwar, die Wahrheit zu 
bekennen, nicht ohn ist, daß ich mir oft eingebildet, ich müsse ohnfehlbar auch von 
einem großen Herrn, oder wenigst einem gemeinen Edelmann, meinen Ursprung haben”  
(Grimmelshausen 15).  Even though Simplicissimus wants to distance himself from these 
new nobles, he also suspects that he, too, might be of noble birth.  The new nobles frame 
the greed and ambition that Simplicissimus encounters and in which he participates over 
and over throughout the novel.  Therefore this “Sucht” is widespread and infectious, 
which allows it to be described as a “natural" human desire.  This “Sucht” is very similar 
to the Machiavellian “desire to acquire” and the Hobbesian “desire for power after 
power,” as it postulates an inclination for all people, including Simplicissimus, to desire 
more.  This inclination for power manifests itself to different degrees throughout the 
novel and is clearly articulated negatively through the character Olivier.   
Olivier is a ruthless killer and robber who justifies his ways by citing 
Machiavellian philosophy.3  Simplicissimus says that Olivier’s actions are against the law 
of nature, the laws of the world, and the law of God.  By presenting this argument, the 
novel widens its view of natural man to define Olivier’s vicious “desire to acquire” as an 
anomaly whose actions are unnatural and against the word of God.  Despite implying 
near the beginning of the novel that the nobleman’s “desire to acquire” is natural, perhaps 
even for Simplicissimus, Olivier’s extreme practices are seen as an unnatural 
exaggeration of this desire.  The novel argues that extending the “desire to acquire” to the 
destruction of others is against the laws of God.  Thus, Grimmelshausen presents a more 
nuanced and therefore more progressive reading of the nature of man than that presented 
by Hobbes.  Grimmelshausen shows while the “desire to acquire” is natural, it can be 
                                                
3 Olivier is discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
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exaggerated to an unnatural level, thereby anticipating the definition later set forth by 
Locke. 
 Locke writes that the natural man is a rational man whose goal is self-preservation 
and who recognizes that his own welfare is best served by looking after the self-
preservation of others.  This version of the natural man is a more peaceful and less 
ruthless version of the Machiavellian and Hobbesian natural man bent on acquisition.   
Locke’s natural man is focused more on preservation than expansion and more on peace 
than war: 
 
Reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, 
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his 
life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of 
one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one 
sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his 
business…Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit 
his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation 
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the 
rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, 
take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, 
the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another (Locke 9). 
 
 
Locke presents natural men as rational and as created equal and independent by a divine 
sovereign to do their work peaceably on earth.  This natural man cooperates with his 
neighbors, and only the abnormal man disturbs the peace enough to warrant the creation 
of a system of government to protect the group.  Locke’s natural men live together in 
harmony like the hermit and Simplicissimus, and it is the abnormal man, who like Olivier 
and the musketeers, disturbs the peace.  Dealing with the abnormal actions of a person 
like  Olivier among rational and God-serving natural men is the basis from which both 
Grimmelshausen and Locke (and Hobbes before them) recommend a political system that 
allows for a harmonious society, freed from the flawed state of nature.  On this issue 
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Grimmelshausen and Locke both break from the absolutism championed by Hobbes, but 
take different routes to their conclusions.   
 
1. C. Part Three of the Political Argument: Advocation of a System of Government 
 
 
 The third part of the political theory, beyond the description of the state of nature 
and the definition of the natural man, is the prescription of a system of government.  Like 
the definition of the state of nature and the natural man, this is a Hobbesian construct.  
Hobbes’ original conception for the system of government that would free people from 
the state of nature was based on a social contract to which the group would agree.  
Although it would infringe on some of their rights, this contract, once formed, would 
protect and serve them.  The system that Hobbes advocated was the Leviathan, a huge 
commonwealth run by an elected sovereign with absolute powers.  Lawrence Burns 
summarizes the Leviathan, in the following manner: 
 
The commonwealth must be constituted as one legal person by a great 
multitude of men, each of whom covenants with all the others to regard 
the will of this legal, civil, or artificial person as his own will.  This legal 
person, the sovereign, “is” the commonwealth.  In practical terms this 
means that every subject should regard all actions of the sovereign power 
as actions of his own, all legislation by the sovereign as his own self-
legislation.  In fact, the sovereign power, the power of representing and 




Hobbes’ sovereign, who “is,” as Burns writes, the commonwealth, is given absolute 
power, that is the power of life and death over those who have agreed to the social 
contract and elected the sovereign.  According to Hobbes, the sovereign must reign over 
all subjects, and the laws of the state or the influence of the church must not limit his 
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power.  The massively powerful sovereign controls the legislative and the executive 
powers.   
 Locke also advocates a social contract, but he disagrees with Hobbes on the 
particular kind of government that should arise from it.  For Locke there is danger for the 
public good if all power is concentrated in the hands of one sovereign, and therefore he 
advocates the separation of powers: 
 
The legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of 
the common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the community and 
the members of it.  But because those laws which are constantly to be 
executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little 
time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always in 
being, not having always business to do.  And because it may be too great 
a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, 
who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power 
to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to 
the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to 
their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest 
from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and 
government:  therefore in well-ordered common-wealths, where the good 
of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into 
the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or 
jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, 
being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have 
made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make 
them for the public good (Locke, Second Treatise of Government 75-76). 
 
 
While Hobbes advocates the concentration of all powers in the sovereign and places the 
sovereign above the law, Locke shows this to be dangerous for the public good on two 
accounts.  First, “human frailty” could allow a leader with both executive and legislative 
powers to create laws in their own personal interest and not in the interest of the public 
good.  If the legislative power resides in the hands of “divers persons,” then the executive 
could never have the power to create laws “to their own private advantage.”  Second, 
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subjecting all people to the law, including those in the communities with executive or 
legislative powers, ensures that laws are made for the public good.   
 Locke’s conception of a government with a separation of powers has had lasting 
impact on the system of government in liberal democracies since his time.  Such a system 
was not yet conceived in Grimmelshausen’s time, but the tools which Locke later used to 
create his system of government were available to Grimmelshausen.  The three-part 
political argument as conceived by Hobbes, which Locke expanded upon, was accessible 
to Grimmelshausen.  Although Simplicissimus does not formulate the same political 
prescriptions as Locke later creates, the novel searches for such a new system of 
government in the existent political worldviews of the time:  the modern, classical and 
the Christian. 
 Characters personify these three worldviews throughout Simplicissimus.  Olivier 
personifies the modern worldview, Jupiter the classical, and the hermit the Christian.  
Further worldviews are presented as physical places that Simplicissimus visits.  These 
worldviews are:  France, Switzerland, and the Mummelsee.  Grimmelshausen has 
Simplicissimus encounter and judge each of these worldviews throughout the novel.  This 
narrative strategy represents an attempt to find solid ground on which to build a system of 
government that will deliver the society of the Thirty Years’ War from its “war of all 
against all.”  Grimmelshausen goes about this search in a way similar to that of Locke in 
his Second Treatise.  Like Locke, Simplicissimus surveys the landscape of political ideas 
to find a more just system of government.  Both Grimmelshausen and Locke conduct 
their searches as a critical reaction to the imperfect absolutism of their times.  
Grimmelshausen’s thorough survey of the political landscape of the seventeenth century 
is the subject of chapter III of this thesis.   
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According to Breuer, Simplicissimus presents a skeptical critique of absolutism: 
 
Wachsende Skepsis gegenüber der Moralität der absolutistischen 
Staatsordnung führt ihn [Grimmelshausen] zu der nun viel 
grundsätzlicheren Frage:  Gibt es überhaupt eine Ordnungsform des 
menschlichen Zusammenlebens, die zu ihrer “Selbsterhaltung” (ratio 
status) nicht in Konflikt mit vorrangigen moralischen Prinzipien gerät? 
(Breuer, “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation” 324). 
 
 
Breuer shows that Grimmelshausen surveys the existing political worldviews in an 
attempt to answer the question whether a system of government (“Ordnungsform des 
menschlichen Zusammenlebens”) can allow for morality and “Selbsterhaltung” and the 
Machiavellian “desire to acquire” to function side by side.  By challenging the model of 
absolutism, the novel must present its own answer to the question of a prescriptive 
political system, and it attempts to do so by searching for such a structure in the modern, 
classical, and Christian worldviews.   
 For Breuer, each book of Simplicissimus holds a political argument that critiques 
absolutism:  “Die politische Fragestellung ist im Simplicissimus zwar nicht die 
vorherrschende, doch enthält, auffällig genug, jedes der fünf Bücher einen Beitrag zum 
Problem einer gerechten, vor göttlichem und natürlichem Recht verantwortbaren 
Sozialordnung” (Breuer, “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation” 324).  Breuer’s 
account of political argumentation in each book points to the fact that the 
“frühabsolutistische Staatslehre” (326) and “Ständeprobleme” (325) places some 
members of society above others, and therefore people cannot live peaceably together as 
a group in this society:  
 
Ein friedliches Zusammenleben ist, wenn überhaupt, nur außerhalb der 
staatlichen Ordnung möglich, und zwar in einer kleineren religiösen 
Sozietät, die durch strenge Selbstdisziplin die Freiheit zur Sünde 
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einzuschränken sucht und so der conditio humana in besonderer Weise 
Rechnung trägt…So bleibt nur noch die Lebensform der Einsiedelei, die 
allerdings wegen der hohen Anforderungen an die Selbstdisziplin auch 
wieder problematisch wird.  Doch hat Grimmelshausen mit diesem Schritt 
die Ebene der politischen Argumentation bereits verlassen.  Als Ergebnis 
der politischen Diskurse bleibt somit festzuhalten: die absolutistische 
Staatsform bietet, aus der Perspektive des Untertanen, keine Möglichkeit 
zu einem friedlichen, an den Prinzipien des göttlichen und natürlichen 
Rechts orientierten Leben, und andere realisierbare soziale 
Ordnungsformen sind für Grimmelshausen zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht 




Breuer’s description of the novel’s political insights demonstrates why Simplicissimus 
decides to return to the life of a hermit.  The organization of society has failed him.  The 
system of government built upon a definition of man that places one above another due to 
social rank or noble birth is inadequate, because its citizens’ “desire to acquire” drives 
them to emulate the warlike actions of the nobility and turns them against one another, 
and, in turn, against Christian morals.  The moral life, as Simplicissimus seeks it, is only 
to be found away from society and under strict discipline.  Though Breuer does indicate 
that Simplicissimus answers the third part of the political argument by rejecting all 
systems of government, he does not take a strong enough stance when he implies that this 
is simply “grundsätzliche  Skepsis” of the absolute state (Breuer 329).  My research 
shows that Simplicissimus is a resounding rejection of all attempted worldviews up to this 
point in history except the Christian – a daring political statement for the novel.  
Simplicissimus tears to shreds the social contract that Hobbes so painstakingly 
constructed and returns to the state of nature to start over.  For Simplicissimus, there is no 
reliable solid ground in the society to trust.  Neither the past, present, nor the promise of 
the future holds any hope for Simplicissimus, so he leaves society and returns to the state 
of nature.  Breuer asserts that at this point Grimmelshausen ends his political 
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argumentation in the novel:  “Doch hat Grimmelshausen mit diesem Schritt [returning to 
the “Lebensform der Einsiedelei”] die Ebene der politischen Argumentation bereits 
verlassen” (Breuer 328).  This is not true.  Grimmelshausen does not simply reject 
society; he makes a political argument that there is no existent system of government to 
be trusted.  After this claim, he returns his focus to the second part of the argument, the 
natural man.  Simplicissimus starts his life anew.  Simplicissimus’ return to the state of 
nature shows Grimmelshausen’s attempt to reopen the political argument from the 
beginning.  He literally rewinds the political argument.  Society has failed, and the state 
of nature, despite its hardships and imperfections, is the safest place to be.  The attention 
of the political argument must begin anew with its attention on natural man.  This is 
precisely where Locke later reexamines the political argument, beginning with the state 
of nature and the natural man with which Simplicissimus ends.  As a bridge between 
Hobbes and Locke, the political discourse in Simplicissimus dismantles Hobbes’ 
prescriptions for society and gives new definitions to the state of nature and natural man.  
Grimmelshausen’s literary work anticipates Locke, who redefines the system of 
government that should arise from the state of nature.  By anticipating Locke with the 
argumentation in Simplicissimus, Grimmelshausen shows that he was not only a skeptic 
of the absolute state, as Breuer attests, but also, as I srgue, a political thinker with 
remarkable insight for his time.  
 
2. SUMMARY OF SIMPLICISSIMUS’ ASSOCIATION WITH THE POLITICAL 
DISCOURSES OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 
 
 
 The three parts of the political argument summarize the insightful political treatise 
set forth in Simplicissimus.   
  24 
What is the state of nature?  Simplicissimus presents the state of nature as the time 
Simplicissimus spends with the hermit in the woods.  This is a life of hard physical work, 
but cooperation between the hermit and Simplicissimus.  It is a spiritual time for the two 
characters and the most peaceful period for Simplicissimus in the whole novel.  However, 
the forest is not without dangers, as evidenced by the marauding musketeers who plunder 
his hut.   
Who is the natural man?  In Simplicissimus, the natural man has two contradictory 
parts that are both manifested in the character Simplicissimus.   The first trait of the 
natural man is what Machiavelli describes as the “desire to acquire,” and the second is a 
Christian capacity for love and kindness.   Simplicissimus demonstrates the “desire to 
acquire” in his dreams of being of noble birth and demonstrates his capacity for Christian 
morality as the hermit’s companion.  The contradictory nature of man makes him 
unsuited to live in peace with others.  In any societal arrangement other than a small 
group where Christian self-discipline is enacted, his “desire to acquire” leads him to 
ruthless behavior.  
What is the political system that emerges from this state under a social contract?  
There is no system that can reconcile the contradictory nature of man.  The system of 
absolute power and divided classes leads to a Hobbesian “war of all against all” in 
society.  Simplicissimus advocates the return to the state of nature as the safest alternative 
for a peaceful life.   
 The political discourse presented in Simplicissimus reflects the political climate of 
the times in which it was published.   Between Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) and Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government (1689), Simplicissimus (1668) rejects the absolutism 
favored by Hobbes, and anticipates the definitions of the state of nature and of natural 
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man that Locke later uses to define a system of government founded on the separation of 
powers.  Because Simplicissimus contains all the aspects of a political argument as 
established by Hobbes and because this argumentation anticipates the groundbreaking 
work of Locke, the novel Simplicissimus must be considered a serious treatise of political 
philosophy and Grimmelshausen a serious political theorist.   
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CHAPTER III:  THE CRITIQUE OF VISIONS OF DISTOPIAN AND UTOPIAN 
WORLDVIEWS IN SIMPLICISSIMUS 
 
 
 Grimmelshausen’s examination and rejection of all the political systems presented 
over the five books of Simplicissimus, and his final focus on the individual and the 
Christian worldview, are sufficiently thorough.  The pícaro Simplicissimus encounters 
diverse political systems and examples of morality, which have lasting effects on how the 
novel approaches the three parts of the political argument as outlined above. 
Simplicissimus encounters a vast number of groups and worldviews on his travels, 
spending time with the soldiers from Bohemia, Sweden, and troops from Weimar, as well 
as with witches and thieves.  His travels even take him to the farthest borders of Europe.  
Grimmelshausen uses his role as a novelist, and not simply a political philosopher, to 
survey not only the existing worldviews of the seventeenth century, but also fantastical 
worldviews, which shape the contours of his political insights.  Locke undertook a similar 
reassessment of the existing political landscape of the seventeenth century, minus the 
fantastical worldviews, to establish the basis for his political philosophy twenty-one years 
later.  This chapter focuses on Simplicissimus’ encounters with the six different 
worldviews that most shape Grimmelshausen’s answers to the political argument 
concerning the state of nature, the natural man, and a justification for a specific political 
system.  Of these six influential worldviews, three can be considered distopian and three 
utopian.  The three distopian worldviews are: 1) Jupiter and the worldview of Antiquity; 
2) the godless court life in France; and 3) Olivier and the modern, Machiavellian 
worldview.  The three utopian worldviews that inform the novel’s political argumentation 
are:  1) idyllic Switzerland; 2) the otherworldly Mummelsee; and 3) the hermit and the 
Christian worldview.  Through the examination of these worldviews, and Simplicissimus’ 
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subsequent rejections of all of them except the Christian, it becomes evident why 
Grimmelshausen comes to the political conclusions he does.  The distopian and utopian 
worldviews are divided in two waves as Simplicissimus searches first through the 
distopias and then the utopias.  The chronology of the worldviews provides a crescendo 
to the return to the woods and the life of a hermit, which highlights the acceptance of this 
final worldview.   Furthermore, the rejected distopian and utopian worldviews exhibit the 
large scope of Grimmelshausen’s political project and the artist’s unique freedom vis a 
vis that of the political scientist in critiquing society and politics.  Attention is paid to 
how each worldview is presented and critiqued, and to what Simplicissimus learns from it 
to inform his return to the Christian life of a hermit.  
 
1. THE CRITIQUE OF VISIONS OF DISTOPIAN WORLDVIEWS: JUPITER, 
FRANCE, AND   OLIVIER 
 
 
 After the pícaro has experienced the horrors of the war and the hermit’s Christian 
pedagogy, Simplicissimus encounters the series of three distopias beginning in the 
novel’s third book.  At first the worldviews are not distopian in nature, but rather 
symbolic alternatives to the war and absolutism dominating Simplicissimus’ Germany: 
the enduring lessons of the antique world, the situation in the neighboring France, and the 
new philosophy of the modern, Machiavellian worldview.  Simplicissimus’ encounter 
with this first series of worldviews is a response to the horrors of a broken German 
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1. A. First Distopia: Jupiter and Antiquity 
 
 
In this novel, Jupiter is a raving madman who personifies the worldview of 
antiquity and thus is the personification of the first distopian worldview that 
Simplicissimus encounters.  He presents Simplicissimus with a complicated vision of a 
utopia, which combines the rhetoric of Roman antiquity with Christian allusions and 
progressive ideas to promote a parliamentary system of governance.  Jupiter’s visionary 
worldview is vast in its scope and detail, evoking world peace among all peoples.  He 
personifies a seemingly positive worldview, yet the novel suggests the relevance of this 
view by how it presents him—as a louse-ridden old fool.  The worldview he narrates to 
Simplicissimus begins as a grand plan for saving Germany and the world, but slowly his 
logic crumbles as Simplicissimus asks him more pointed questions and his answers 
become more fantastic, ending in an untenable version of utopia.  Simplicissimus rejects 
the outdated worldview of antiquity, which ultimately appears distopian. 
Simplicissimus meets Jupiter at an impressionable moment in his development; 
directly after leaving his life as the thief, the “Jäger von Soest:”  “derhalben stellte ich 
mein vorig gottlos Leben allerdings ab und beflisse mich allein der Tugend und 
Frömmigkeit” (259).  After his change of heart Simplicissimus and his men hear Jupiter’s 
first words from afar:  “Ich will einmal die Welt strafen, es wolle mirs dann das große 
Numen nicht zugeben!” (260).  Jupiter’s first words are indicative of his character:  he is 
angry at the world, and he is intent on receiving the world’s “Numen,” or divine power. 
The fact that Jupiter seeks divine power shows that he does not have any, and the 
“strafen” for the world he mentions is part of the worldview he explains to 
Simplicissimus.   
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The worldview Jupiter presents at first seems to be strictly of antiquity, as Jupiter 
invokes Roman heroes and gods.  Once Simplicissimus meets Jupiter, he is cast in the 
role of Ganymede, the Roman God Jupiter’s servant and cupbearer, and informed about 
the radical changes which the ruler of Gods is going to bring to the earth:  “Ich will einen 
solchen Helden schicken, der keiner Soldaten bedarf und doch die ganze Welt 
reformieren soll:  in seiner Geburtstund will ich ihm verleihen einen wohlgestalten und 
stärkern Leib, als Herkules einen hatte, mit Fürsichtigkeit, Weisheit und Verstand 
überflüssig geziert” (263).  Once Jupiter begins to speak, the worldview and utopian 
images he evokes take on a more complicated form, while catching Simplicissimus’ ear.   
As Jupiter continues with his speech, it becomes ever clearer that his ideas are 
impossible and as imaginary as the “Held” he describes.  As the wild man Jupiter loses 
his authority, Simplicissimus takes over the role of the leader and Jupiter takes on the role 
of the servant:  Ganymede becomes Jupiter and vice versa.  This change comes about as 
Simplicissimus takes on the role of an inquisitive political scientist and poses questions to 
Jupiter about this impossible vision:  “Wie wird aber Teutschland bei so 
unterschiedlichen Religionen ein so langwierigen Frieden haben können?” (269).  
Jupiter’s answer is vague:  “mein Held…wird…die geist- und weltliche Vorsteher und 
Häupter der christlichen Völker und unterschiedlichen Kirchen mit einer sehr 
beweglichen Sermon anreden und ihnen die bisherige hochschädliche Spaltung in den 
Glaubenssachen trefflich zu Gemüt führen” (269).  This answer is unsatisfactory; surely a 
sermon from a bug-infested speaker about an imagined hero cannot solve the deep-seated 
philosophical differences between the warring religions.  Jupiter’s speech falls apart the 
more he speaks, and interestingly incorporates visions from the Christian tradition and 
progressive political discourse as it collapses. 
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Originally, Jupiter seems to evoke only the antique worldview, but then he 
becomes more Christian, and even progressive, in his polemic.  The savior hero he 
describes begins to take on the characteristics of a second coming of Christ, a single 
powerful hero who will save the world through leadership and speech.  This hero will 
however create a political system with a parliament:  “Also wird er…von jeder Stadt 
durch ganz Teutschland zween von den klügsten und gelehresten Männern zu sich 
nemmen, aus denselben ein Parlament machen” (265).  Jupiter surprisingly presents the 
idea of a representative government here, both a progressive idea for the times and also 
harkening back to the organization of the Roman republic and senate.  According to 
Jupiter, the Christian hero “wird…das Römische Kaisertum wieder aufrichten und sich 
wieder in Teutschland begeben und mit seinem Parlaments-herren eine Stadt mitten in 
Teutschland bauen” (268).   Thus, Jupiter advocates a republican form of government. 
The visions that Jupiter displays are of a stable, fair, united, and powerful 
Germany that could answer the political argument.  His wonderful visions would be 
wholeheartedly accepted, if they could actually be put into place.  The way Jupiter 
depicts the future as perfect and effectual echoes the optimism of antiquity.  The problem 
is his ideas cannot practically be enacted in German-speaking lands of the Thirty Years’ 
War; they are only possible with the help of a magic hero.  Jupiter’s vision becomes most 
fantastic when it presents the world at peace, as he predicts his hero will bring about  “ein 
ewiger beständiger Fried zwischen allen Völkern in der ganzen Welt” (267).  
Simplicissimus can see the wonderful ideal that the world could be in Jupiter’s vision, but 
it is impossible and he rejects the worldview of the Roman gods.  He claims that:  “alle 
andere Götter in der ganzen weiten Welt vor so verrucht, leichtfertig und stinkend 
ausgeschrieen, daß ihr bei den Menschen allen Kredit verloren; du selbst, sagen sie, seiest 
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ein filzlausiger ehebrecherischer Hurenhengst” (271).  Simplicissimus says that people 
have lost faith in the Roman gods, because they are immoral.  Jupiter shows 
Simplicissimus a vision of a utopian world, but his judgment cannot be trusted because 
he is fantastic and immoral. 
As Jupiter’s sway on Simplicissimus wanes, the true god is revealed:  “Indem 
Jupiter so drohete, zog er in Gegenwart meiner und der ganzen Partei die Hosen herunder 
ohn einige Scham, und stöbert die Flöh daraus, welche ihn, wie man an seiner 
sprenklichten Haut wohl sahe, schröcklich tribuliert hatten” (272).  Jupiter literally 
reveals his naked truth to Simplicissimus and his men as crazy and flea-ridden.  World 
peace and cooperation among the religions is considered the imaginary tale of a madman, 
impossible, and out of reach for real society.   
Oddly, Simplicissimus takes Jupiter along on his travels, and returns to Jupiter as 
a friend and counselor throughout the novel.  It seems that Simplicissimus cannot just 
throw away the ideas of antiquity, but rather holds onto them for later consultation.  
Jupiter, unlike Olivier and France, is not completely dispelled.  This indicates that 
Grimmelshausen does not have the heart to throw away all that antiquity may have to 
offer a contemporary political argument, but recognizes it cannot readily provide the 
answers needed at that moment.  It is interesting that the two oldest worldviews presented 
in the novel:  antiquity and Christianity, are the ones that Grimmelshausen does not reject 
outright.  He gives importance to the worldviews that have stood the test of time, even if 
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1. B. Second Distopia: France 
 
 
Simplicissimus’ time at the French court provides him with a version of 
godlessness that quickly characterizes France as a distopia.  It is a locality of seductive 
and deceiving appearances and reckless sexual abandon that culminate in the novel 
condemning both the court and Simplicissimus for having participated in its ways.  His 
departure and ensuing sickness confirm that Grimmelshausen does not see the French 
society and court culture as a solution to Germany’s political and social disarray. Richard 
Schade explains the France scene in his article “Simplicissimus in Paris:”   
 
The moral message of the Paris interlude is self-evident to even the most 
casual reader.  Excessive carnality is punishable; it transforms physical 
beauty to ugliness, tenuous virtue to certain degradation. Viewed as social 
commentary, the episode is in the nature of Hofkritik, a perspective with 
particular credibility given the novel’s satirical views on various societal 
institutions.  Some scholars might even glory in Grimmelshausen’s 
apparent disdain for the French as evidenced, for example, in the implicit 
critique of the hyperfashionable dress code at court (Schade 33). 
 
 
The rejection of France and Simplicissimus’ subsequent sickness create a political 
statement because this distopia does not provide Simplicissimus with any answers to the 
political argument.  In fact, it is nearly fatal, and the protagonist only can recover by 
leaving France and returning to Germany. 
 In contrast to the personal distopia of Jupiter, France is portrayed as a place, the 
physical boundary of the country, and specifically Paris, which Simplicissimus visits.  
Like his encounter with Jupiter, the new worldview attracts him at first. Upon arrival in 
France, Simplicissimus begins to change his physical appearance and the perception of 
his social standing.  First he receives a set of secondhand clothes as the noblemen he is 
accompanying dress themselves in the newest French style:  “Und demnach ich mich so 
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fein anließe, schenkt er [der Edelmann] mir sein Kleid, so er ablegte, dann er sich auf die 
neue Mode kleiden ließe” (362-363).  At this moment Simplicissimus takes his first step 
towards looking and then acting like another person, taking a cue from the other 
noblemen who change fashion upon arrival.  Simplicissimus also changes his social 
standing to that of a nobleman by lying to his new master, Monsigneur Canard:  “Ich 
gedachte wohl, daß ich nicht viel gülte, wenn ich mein Herkommen öffnen sollte, gab 
mich derhalben vor einen armen teutschen Edelmann aus, der weder Vatter noch Mutter, 
sondern nur noch etliche Verwandte in einer Festung hätte, darin schwedische Garison 
läge” (365).  Monsigneur Canard, whose name speaks for itself, is convinced by his tale 
and soon Simplicissimus finds himself in Canard’s circle, including in the presence of the 
royal “Zeremonienmeister,” who invites him to sing for the king at the Louvre.  
Simplicissimus’ second change in appearance and standing occurs as he is dressed as 
Orpheus to appear in a comedy before the king.  Simplicissimus explains his 
transformation with the help of Monsigneur Canard:  “meine Schönheit mit Oleo Talci 
erhöhern und meine halbkrause Haar, die von Schwärze glitzerten, verpudern wollte, 
fande er [M. Canard], daß er mich nur damit verstellte; ich wurde mit einem 
Lorbeerkranz bekröne und in ein antikisch meergrün Kleid angetan” (370).  The “Kleid” 
that Simplicissimus wears is very revealing and once he is on stage he finds that the 
women of the court pay special attention to him, as he describes their behavior:  “die 
Spectatore, und sonderlich die Weiber gewaltig zoge, ihre Augen auf mich zu wenden” 
(372) and he soon takes on a new name:  “ich kriegte auch einen andern Namen, indem 
mich forthin die Franzosen nicht anders als Beau Alman nenneten” (372).  As the “Beau 
Alman,” Simplicissimus is transformed into a new person in appearance, name, social 
standing, and soon actions, leaving his former life and wife temporarily behind to assume 
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a different worldview.  The deceptive appearances in France—theater, new clothes and 
new monikers—lead Simplicissimus to new actions with similarly disguised, masked 
women who seduce him. 
 After his performance at the French court, Simplicissimus is informed that he 
should instruct the young son of a nobleman on the lute, a charge that he accepts.  
However, once he arrives at the designated location to meet his new student, he finds an 
older noblewoman of the French court who convinces him to accompany her to a secret 
chamber, where he is seduced by several women.  This older noblewoman personifies the 
sexual abandon of the French court.   She refers to his body as an object that can be 
flaunted for the country of France:  “ein solcher Leib, mit welchem unsere ganze Nation 
prangen kann” (376) whereas he refers to himself as “einem unschuldigen Teutschen” 
(376).  The borders of sound morality are drawn with the national border of France.  The 
German is drawn into a location of sexual immorality in France, as the noblewoman 
comments:  “die verehelichte Cavallier ziehen selten in Frankreich” (378).  
Simplicissimus is seduced and stays in the secret quarters with multiple women:  
“Dergestalt bracht ich acht Täg und so viel Nächt an diesem Ort zu, und glaube, daß die 
andern drei [Frauen] auch bei mir gelgen seien” (380).  Although Simplicissimus 
describes the seductive noblewoman as “gottlose” (377), he gladly assumes the role that 
the noblewoman has provided him.  The godlessness that Simplicissimus encounters in 
France is sexual immorality.   
 The novel criticizes this promiscuous French sexuality and Simplicissimus’ role 
in it, by having him leave Paris and immediately fall ill.   Sickness is a reoccurring theme 
in the novel, first tied to the new nobles on the first page of the novel who exemplify the 
unhealthy “desire to acquire” that threatens the social order.  In the Paris episodes of 
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Book IV sickness characterizes both France and Simplicissimus’ actions there.  
Simplicissimus’ master Monsigneur Canard, who is a doctor, has even taken on the 
sickness of the French court, as Simplicissimus explains:  “war er auch überaus hoffärtig 
und wollte sich sehen lassen; welche Krankheit er von großen Herren an sich genommen 
[hat]” (366).  Simplicissimus falls sick directly after leaving France:  “Im zweiten 
Nachtläger von Paris aus…mein Kopf tät mir so grausam wehe, daß mir unmüglich war 
aufzustehen” (383).  Simplicissimus goes on to lose his beautiful hair, becomes covered 
with spots “als ein Tiger” (384), and becomes “so häßlich” (385).  The sickness that 
characterizes the new nobles striving for social mobility at the beginning of the novel 
persists in France and affects Simplicissimus there, showing that the answers to 
Germany’s ills and social problems cannot be found in a land characterized by the same 
ailments.   
Simplicissimus and France, with their deceiving appearances and reckless sexual 
abandon, are punished through sickness.  Simplicissimus recognizes the change in 
himself and wishes to reform his ways by rejecting the lifestyle of the French court:  “o 
schnelle und unglückselige Veränderung!  vor vier Wochen war ich ein Kerl, der die 
Fürsten zur Verwunderung bewegte, das Frauenzimmer entzuckte, und dem Volk als ein 
Meisterstück der Natur, ja wie ein Engel vorkam, jetzt aber so ohnwert, daß mich die 
Hund anpißten” (386).   France’s sexual disorder appears to be symptomatic of its poor 
social order.  In an ironic twist, Simplicissimus learns that he had in fact acquired not a 
sexual disease, but a childhood pox, i.e., he is not a fully adult male. 
Simplicissimus has found nothing in France that can help him answer the political 
argument; he has only found bad examples of morality and these will lead him back to 
the Christian worldview and a new emphasis on the individual.  The worldview presented 
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in France is considered godless and unnatural, and cannot be used as a model to reform 
Germany.   
 
1. C. Third Distopia: Olivier and the Modern Worldview 
 
 
 Olivier personifies the modern, Machiavellian worldview, which is the most 
powerful distopian vision that Simplicissimus encounters.  This is the final distopia that 
Simplicissimus meets before encountering the series of utopian worldviews.  This 
worldview is untenable for Grimmelshausen, because it leads to overindulgence in the 
Machiavellian “desire to acquire,” which, if lived out by everyone the way it is by 
Olivier, would result in a chaotic society and the damnation of all souls who participate.  
As Olivier explains his acquaintance with Machiavelli and his choice to live according to 
his writings:  “Mein lieber Simplici, du hast den Machiavellum noch nicht gelesen; ich 
bin eines recht aufrichtigen Gemüts, und treibe diese Manier zu leben frei offentlich ohne 
allen Scheu” (419).   Olivier’s function in the novel’s plot illuminates how 
Grimmelshausen examines the Machiavellian worldview as a possible alternative to 
absolutism.  First, Grimmelshausen must find a way for Simplicissimus to encounter this 
distopian vision.  Because the modern worldview represents a theoretical vision, and not 
a geographical space, it necessarily must be personified by a person who exemplifies its 
ideals.  Thus, while Antiquity is personified by Jupiter, Modernity is personified by 
Olivier.  Simplicissimus admonishes the ruthless Olivier’s actions as being: “wider das 
Gesetz der Natur,...wider wie weltliche Gesetz, ...[und] auch wider Gott“ (419).  This is 
the first indication that Grimmelshausen criticizes the modern worldview.  The final 
indication that Grimmelshausen does not champion Olivier’s distopia, is when Olivier 
meets a brutal death after being attacked by musketeers:  “einen solchen Streich kriegte 
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Olivier von dem siebenden, und zwar mit solchem Gewalt, daß ihm das Hirn 
herausspritzte” (448).  Olivier dies by the sword by which he has lived.  Because Olivier 
personifies the modern, Machiavellian worldview this distopia is dismissed when Olivier 
dies.   
 The rejection of Olivier’s worldview shows that Grimmelshausen’s vision of a 
just society cannot include the ruthless behavior of an Olivier, who parasitically lives off 
others by robbing and attacking them.  Olivier sees himself as a prince, with only his 
immediate belongings as his kingdom.  Grimmelshausen’s rejection of Olivier’s way of 
life is open to multiple in interpretations.  First, if Olivier is admonished for his actions, 
nobles might also be admonished for this behavior.  This is problematic, as any society, 
which wishes to protect itself, would need to be ruthless in war to maintain its security.  
The charge that Olivier is acting against God’s rules indicates that the members of a just 
society must follow divine laws.  This is indeed the main thrust of Grimmelshausen’s 
final judgment that the Christian life of the hermit is best.   
 
2. THE CRITIQUE OF VISIONS OF UTOPIAN WORLDVIEWS:  SWITZERLAND, 
MUMMELSEE, AND HERMIT 
 
 
 The second wave of worldviews that Simplicissimus encounters after the series of 
distopias is a series of utopias which lack the intrinsic problems of the distopian 
worldviews, and, with the exception of the Christian worldview, are also of no help in 
providing answers to the social problems that plague Simplicissimus’ Germany.  
Switzerland and the Mummelsee are functioning societies, but it is not possible to map 
them onto German society, and therefore they do not provide Simplicissimus with the 
political answers he seeks.  Chronologically, these views contain political insights for 
  38 
Simplicissimus on the way to his culminating decision to leave society and return to the 
hermit’s Christian worldview and life.   
 
2. A. First Utopia: Switzerland 
 
 Simplicissimus’ trip to utopian Switzerland is a turning point that sets him on the 
track towards his final decision to return to the state of nature as a hermit and begin the 
political argument anew.  The turning point begins with Olivier’s death, and therewith the 
death of the Machiavellian worldview, and Simplicissimus’ reunification with his true 
friend Herzbruder.  Olivier guides Simplicissimus in the final distopia of the novel, and 
after his death, Herzbruder leads Simplicissimus to the novel’s first utopia in Switzerland.  
The juxtaposition of Olivier and Herzbruder with their corresponding distopian and 
utopian worldviews at Simplicissimus’ turning point highlights his attraction to the two 
characters, despite their polar opposition.  In the article “Simplicius zwischen Herzbruder 
und Olivier,” Aurnhammer characterizes Simplicissimus’ attraction to these two 
characters:  
 
Simplicissimus ist…mit Herzbruder und Olivier in einer Weise 
verbunden, die dem antikisierenden Ideal unzertrennlicher, heroischer 
Freundschaft entspricht […] Denn demgemäß stilisiert Simplicius alle 
seine freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu inniger “Bruderschaft’ und 
ordnet sie als lebenslangen Bund sogar der Ehe über.  So begleitet er 
Herzbruder auf seiner Wallfahrt nach Einsiedeln und weiter nach Wein, 
statt zu seiner Ehefrau nach Lippstadt zurückzukehren (Aurnhammer 51). 
 
 
 Simplicissimus’ attraction to Olivier and Herzbruder is interpreted as a version of a 
“Bruderschaft” by Aurnhammer, as a friendship that is more important than other 
relationships, including marriage.  Simplicissimus’ strongly influential “Bruderschaft” 
with Olivier and Herzburder can be seen as his attraction to the worldviews that they 
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personify (Machiavellian) or to which they lead him (Switzerland).  After Olivier’s death, 
Simplicissimus’ relationship with him, the Machiavellian worldview, and the series of  
distopias comes to an end, and instead of returning home to his wife, the more dominant 
attraction to Herzbruder and his search for the political and social solutions to the ills of 
Germany continues through the examination of a series of utopian worldviews.  
Herzbruder does not personify a worldview like the hermit or Olivier, but he is a good 
friend to Simplicissimus and a pious influence on him, who leads him to the first vision 
of a utopia in the novel in Switzerland.   
 Like the distopian France, the utopian Switzerland is a physical place that 
Herzbruder and Simplicissimus explore.  Their pilgrimage to Einsiedeln, in Switzerland 
offers an idyllic view of a German-speaking society that is functioning the way 
Simplicissimus wishes Germany would work.  Simplicissimus explains:   
 
Das Land kame mir so fremd vor gegen andern teutschen Ländern, als 
wenn ich in Brasilia oder in China gewesen wäre; da sahe ich die Leute in 
dem Frieden handlen und wandlen, die Ställe stunden voll Viehe, die 
Baurnhöf lieffen voll Hühner, Gäns und Enten, die Straßen wurden sicher 
von den Reisenden gebraucht, die Wirtshäuser saßen voll Leute, die sich 
lustig machten; da war ganz keine Forcht vor dem Feind, keine Sorg vor 
der Plünderung, und keine Angst, sein Gut, Leib noch Leben zu verlieren; 
ein jeder lebte sicher unter seinem Weinstock und Feigebaum, und zwar 
gegen andern teutschen Ländern zu rechnen, in lauter Wollust und Freud, 
also daß ich dieses Land vor ein irdisch Paradies hielte, wiewohln es von 
Art rauch genug zu sein schiene (465-466). 
 
 
Simplicissimus sees a functioning utopia, “ein irdisch Paradies,” and he points out that 
this is a German-speaking land without the problems that he is used to seeing in 
Germany.  Switzerland has no war to interrupt its economy nor to set its citizens in fear 
for their lives.  The Swiss are happy, their society is in working order, and Switzerland is 
as “fremd” to Simplicissimus as Brazil or China.  This passage suggests that 
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Simplicissimus links German-speaking lands with an inherently broken society, but in 
Switzerland he sees the possibility of functioning German-speaking community.   
In the midst of this utopia Simplicissimus returns to the political argument and 
specifically the natural man.  For Simplicissimus the natural man in this functioning 
society is a Catholic, as Einsiedeln is a Catholic pilgrimage site.  He sees an exorcism 
upon arriving in Einsiedeln: “Solchergestalt langten wir zu Einsiedlen an, und kamen 
eben in die Kirch, als ein Priester einen Besessenen exorzisieret” (467).  The spirit that 
the priest is exorcizing calls out to Simplicissimus:  “Oho, du Kerl, schlägt dich der 
Hagelauch hier? Ich hab vermeint, dich zu meiner Heimkunft bei dem Olivier in unserer 
höllischen Wohnung anzutreffen; so sehe ich wohl, du läßt dich hier finden, du 
ehebrecherischer mörderischer Hurenjäger, darfst du dir wohl einbilden, uns zu 
entrinnen?” (468).  The fact that the spirit knows his relationship with Olivier unnerves to 
Simplicissimus.  Here in the middle of a utopia, Simplicissimus’ recent sins are brought 
to light.  To leave this past behind and to return to the political argument and the natural 
man, Simplicissimus converts to Catholicism and at once receives absolution of his 
previous sins and takes on the religion of the natural man in the Swiss utopian.   
Simplicissimus’ conversion to Catholicism is a step towards his final action of 
leaving society and becoming a hermit.  As a hermit and natural man in the state of nature 
Simplicissimus takes a part of the Swiss utopia with him.  The version of the natural man 
with which Grimmelshausen restarts the political argument at the end of the novel is a 
pious Catholic hermit in the state of nature.  The origin of the actual town of Einsiedeln, 
Switzerland, depicted in the novel is central to the Swiss utopia.  Rosmarie Zeller 
explains the origin of Einsiedeln in her article “Die Wallfahrt nach Einsiedeln. Zum 
Kontext simplicianischer Frömmigkeit:” 
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Die Bedeutung Einsiedelns für den süddeutschen Raum:  Wie der Name 
sagt, ist das Kloster Einsiedeln, welches im Kanton Schwyz, nur wenige 
Weg-Stunden vom oberen Zürichsee entfernt in ein Geländemulde liegt, 
aus einer Einsiedelei entstanden.  Der aus dem Geschlecht der Zollern 
stammende Benediktiner Meinrad hat sich um 835 im sogenannten 
Finsterwald niedergelassen.  934 wurde dann an dieser Stelle das Kloster 
gegründet, welches unter anderem Besitzungen im Elsass, im Breisgau 
und in Vorarlberg hatte (Zeller 222). 
  
 
Einsiedeln, Switzerland, retains the name of its origin as a Catholic hermitage.  The fact 
that it was created from a hermitage, just like the one Simplicissimus creates at the end of 
the novel, and that it grew into a thriving pilgrimage location, central to the utopian 
Switzerland presented in the novel, indicates that Simplicissimus may be able to create a 
similar utopia in Germany by following the same method.  Simplicissimus has found part 
of his answer to the political argument regarding the natural man in idyllic Switzerland 
and has taken a step towards emulating this natural man through his conversion to 
Catholicism.  While it cannot be proven that Grimmelshausen knew the exact story of 
Einseideln’s development and its parallel to the actions of his main character, his choice 
of a utopian pilgrimage site connected in name to Simplicissimus’ final political decision 
seems hardly coincidental.  Simplicissimus’ conversion to Catholicism in Switzerland is 
his first step towards attempting to repeat the results of a utopia in Germany by starting a 
hermitage of his own. 
 
2. B. Second Utopia: Mummelsee 
 
 
 The second utopia that Simplicissimus encounters is the underwater and 
otherworldly Mummelsee.  The Mummelsee connects all the waters of the world through 
the center of the earth and is inhabited by mermen and mermaids who live long, healthy 
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lives in harmony with each other under the rule of a king who manages the inner 
workings of their highly developed society.  Simplicissimus visits the Mummelsee with 
the help of a magical stone that allows him to breathe underwater and a merman guide 
who explains the ways of the Mummelsee society. Of particular interest to my 
investigation of political and social systems is that Simplicissimus’ curiosity about the 
Mummelsee corresponds to his conversion to Catholicism and his dedication to a 
“gottseligen Leben” (507):  
 
Ich resolvierte mich, weder mehr nach Ehren noch Geld, noch nach etwas 
anders das die Welt liebt, zu trachten; ja ich nahme mir vor zu 
philosophieren, und mich eines gottseligen Lebens zu befleißen, zumalen 
meine Unbußfertigkeit zu bereuen, und mich zu befleißen, gleich meinem 
Vatter sel. auf die höchste Staffeln der Tugenden zu steigen (506-507). 
 
 
After deciding finally to leave his godless past behind him and to “philosophize,” 
Simplicissimus is also struck with “[d]ie Begierde den Mummelsee zu beschauen” (507).  
Simplicissimus displays an earnest curiosity in visiting the Mummelsee, thereby 
supporting the argument that he is looking for viable alternatives to the social order that 
could fix the ills he has come to know in first half of the novel.  Simplicissimus’ new 
intention to “philosophize” correlates strongly to his interest in exploring the 
Mummelsee, which is investigated in great detail as a possible answer to the political 
argument.  The utopian society of the Mummelsee first strongly appeals to 
Simplicissimus, until he learns that the inhabitants’ souls die with their bodies and that 
they never achieve an eternal life in heaven, a state only afforded to humans.  Two 
aspects of the Mummelsee episode deserve further investigation within the framework of 
this study.  First, it is crucial to understand that the Mummelsee cannot be mapped onto 
human society as a possible system of government, as suggested by the metaphor of its 
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entirely aquatic environment. Without the magic stone, Simplicissimus cannot survive 
there.  Second, it is striking that the Mummelsee utopia is presented to Simplicissimus in 
the exact same order as the political argument: first he is acquainted with the state of 
nature in the Mummelsee, then with the natural man, and finally with the structure of 
government that organizes their aquatic society.  Finally, the lessons that Simplicissimus 
learns in the Mummelsee reinforce the cornerstone of his political thinking, i.e., that a 
just political system must allow for eternal salvation and be built upon the proper 
definition of the natural man, who, in turn, must be holy.  
 The Mummelsee is situated in an improbable location: “[a]uf einem von den 
höchsten Bergen” (502).  The location of a sea at the top of a mountain indicates the 
impossibility of such a utopia interacting meaningfully with human society, yet some 
political lessons may be learned from it.  After his trip to Switzerland, Simplicissimus 
returns to the Spessart, and first hears about the Mummelsee from townspeople living 
nearby.  The townspeople explain that noblemen had examined the mysterious sea and 
tried to harness its strange powers but failed to even find out much about it: “es fanden 
sich […] Baursleut, […] die erzählten, daß noch bei ihrem und ihrer Vätter Gedenken 
hohe fürstliche Personen den besagten See zu beschauen sich erhoben, wie denn ein 
regierender Herzog zu Würtenberg, etc. einen Floß machen, und mit demselbigen darauf 
hineinfahren lassen, seine Tiefe abzumessen” (503-504).  The townspeople continue to 
explain that the Herzog zu Württenberg failed to find out anything about the lake before 
his boat mysteriously sank (503), and another nobleman, the Erzherzog von Österreich, 
had planned to remove the water from the sea to learn more about it, but was dissuaded 
by the people living nearby for fear of being inundated (504).  The inability of the 
noblemen to uncover secrets about the Mummelsee reveals two political aspects about 
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this utopia.  First, it is a critique of absolutism; the noblemen are not the people best 
equipped to discover utopian political systems.  In striking contrast to their failed 
attempts, the picaresque hero Simplicissimus is later able to discover its secrets.  Second, 
the Mummelsee utopia exists entirely in a different medium, underwater.  Translating it 
to human society could only result in flooding and ruin.  
Unlike the noblemen, Simplicissimus is granted access to the Mummelsee and its 
utopian secrets.  The strange, mermen creatures literally rise from the depths to meet him.  
Following his newfound promise to philosophize, Simplicissimus, with the magic stone 
in his pocket, descends with his guide and gains knowledge about the Mummelsee by 
asking in order the three main questions of the political argument.  First, he learns about 
the state of nature in the Mummelsee through a lengthy description by his guide.  
Simplicissimus’ guide explains that all the water of the world is connected through the 
hollow earth in a “großen Wunderwerk” (513).  Like a good political scientist, 
Simplicissimus then acquires knowledge about the individuals who inhabit the 
Mummelsee:  “fragte [Simplicissimus], ob sie sterbliche Kreaturen wären” (514).  He 
finds out from his guide that: “[die Wassermänner der Mummelsee] sind keine Geister, 
sondern sterbliche Leutlein, die zwar mit vernünftigen Seelen begabt, welche aber samt 
den Leibern dahinsterben und vergehen” (514).  Simplicissimus presses his guide for 
more answers about the inhabitants of the Mummelsee and finds that they know neither 
sin nor sickness and live very well in their utopia: 
 
der allergütigste Schöpfer uns genugsam beseligt, als mit einer guten 
gesunden Vernunft […] mit gesunden Leibern, mit langem Leben, mit der 
edlen Freiheit, mit genugsamer Wissenschaft, Kunst und Verstand aller 
natürlichen Dinge; und endlich, so das allermeiste ist, sind wir keener 
Sünd, und dannenhero auch keener Straf, noch dem Zorn Gottes, ja nicht 
einmal der geringsten Krankheit unterworfen” (516). 
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Simplicissimus appears deeply impressed by the wonderful lives of individuals in the 
aquatic utopia, whose enviable lives contrast sharply with the misery of German-speaking 
lands in the Thirty Years’ War.  He then inquires about next step of the political 
argument, the system of government that organizes their society.  The guide answers: “sie 
hätten ihren König nicht, daß er Justitiam administrieren, noch daß sie ihm dienen sollten, 
sondern daß er […] ihre Geschäfte dirigiere” (516).  The king of the Mummelsee does 
not have to see that justice is served in his kingdom, because the inhabitants do not 
commit crimes and sin, he simply serves as manager of their affairs.  Simplicissimus is 
prompted to ask whether they might be a higher form of life than humans in God’s eyes:  
“Wenn es mit euch so beschaffen, so ist euer Geschlecht von unserm Schöpfer weit höher 
geadelt und beseligt, als das unserige” (517).  The guide answers that: “ihr seid weit 
mehreres beseligt als wir, indem ihr zu der seligen Ewigkeit, und das Angesicht Gottes 
unaufhörlich anzuschauen erschaffen” (517).  Simplicissimus discovers that the utopia of 
the Mummelsee exists without God’s promise of eternal life.  No matter how wonderful 
the Mummelsee may seem, heaven is closed to mermen; their utopia is not perfect, and 
therefore not fit for humans.  By carefully studying the Mummelsee, Simplicissimus has 
established that a utopia for humans must include the promise of eternal life.  Without the 
possibility of heaven, even the greatest earthly utopia on earth is insufficient.  The idea 
that a utopia must include the promise of the afterlife answers the political argument that 
Simplicissimus establishes as the cornerstone of his later decision to leave society. A holy 
existence that allows for an eternal life in heaven must be the first component of a 
working political system and the ideal attribute of the natural man on which the system is 
built.  Even the inhabitants of the utopian Mummelsee envy the humans who have the 
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chance of a “ewigen seligen Leben und den unendlichen himmlischen Freuden” (522).  
The mermen’s utopian, yet finite, earthly existence is nothing compared to eternal life in 
heaven. 
 The Mummelsee represents a utopia that cannot exist in Simplicissimus’ 
Germany.  While the underwater world inhabited by mermen and mermaids is a highly 
functioning civilization without the problems that plague Germany, it is in a different 
medium and constituted of different beings that inhibits mapping its utopian system onto 
the war-torn German society.  Simplicissimus explores this utopia after his trip to 
Switzerland and after deciding to commit to a “gottseligen Leben” (507).  Following his 
conversion to Catholicism in Switzerland, the reemphasis on changing his own life is 
Simplicissimus’ next step towards returning to the life of a hermit.  After stating his 
intent to reform his life, Simplicissimus travels to the Mummelsee in a reinvigorated 
search for the utopian system that could reform his Germany.  Simplicissimus’ emphasis 
on purifying his life and his curiosity of finding a utopia reflect the novel’s engagement 
with the political argument and the role of the natural man and the just political system.  
While the highly evolved society of the Mummelsee deeply attracts the protagonist, the 
impossibility of using the Mummelsee framework to reform Germany is emphasized.  
Simplicissimus does however learn from his interaction with this utopia that the 
cornerstone of a just society must begin with a natural man who has the possibility of 
achieving eternal salvation.  Simplicissimus takes this important notion to heart once he 
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2. C. Third Utopia: The Hermit’s Life 
 
The final utopia engaged in the novel is Simplicissimus’ return to the woods and 
the life of the hermit.  The fifth and final book of the novel ends with this utopia and 
emphasizes it as the best answer to the political argument that Simplicissimus can 
achieve.  The return to the state of nature marks his decisive break with society and his 
renewal of the initial political argument.  Simplicissimus has found neither the dominant 
political system of his time, absolutism, nor the any of the distopian or utopian 
worldviews he has examined, other than the Christian worldview, to be adequate for 
supporting a just society.  Therefore, he uses what he has learned from his exhaustive 
examination of Europe during the Thirty Years’ War to create a just society from the 
bottom up.  The elements of the hermit utopia developed at beginning of the novel under 
the tutelage of the paternal hermit serve as the template for the founding of his own 
hermitage. Grimmelshausen’s depiction of Simplicissimus’ final travels foreshadows his 
return to the life of a hermit and the culminating political decisions Simplicissimus makes 
before returning to a solitary Christian life. 
Simplicissimus’ formative years in the woods were discussed above as a time of 
peace, spiritual learning, and hard work with the help and guidance of the hermit.  The 
woods were far safer than the war-torn society beyond them.  Grimmelshausen’s 
depiction of their cooperative relationship in the woods is an inversion of Hobbes’ 
society and state of nature, in which nature is a “war of all against all” that can only be 
alleviated by escape into society.   The solitary Christian life of the hermit is not without 
its difficulties as hard work is necessary for survival and the threat of attack is ever 
present, even in the milder Lockian state of nature.  Grimmelshausen and Locke 
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acknowledge that “transgressors” will disturb that peace of the state of nature.  Despite 
the hard work and the threat of “transgressors,” Simplicissimus favors this solitary life 
above any other political system he has encountered in the European society during the 
Thirty Years’ War.  
Simplicissimus’ adventures continue in rapid fashion between leaving the 
Mummelsee and deciding to return to the hermit’s life. Between these two final utopias 
Grimmelshausen has his hero travel to the farthest edges of the European world.  
Simplicissimus sets out from Germany for Russia and from there a series of short 
adventures take him through Egypt, Constantinople, Venice, and finally to Rome.  From 
Rome, Simplicissimus makes his way back to Germany with a group of pilgrims: 
 
Demnach begab ich mich den nächsten Weg auf Rom […] nachdem ich 
mich ungefähr sechs Wochen daselbst aufgehalten, nahme ich meinen 
Weg mit Pilgern, darunter auch Teutsche und sonderlich etliche Schweizer 
waren, die wieder nach Haus wollten (562). 
 
 
Simplicissimus’ return to Germany as a pilgrim fittingly foreshadows his final decision to 
return to the woods as a hermit.  Simplicissimus progresses from being  a pilgrim in the 
greater European setting to becoming a settled hermit in a German setting. 
Once arriving home in the Black Forest, Simplicissimus reflects upon what he 
learned while on his final travels: 
 
Ich war drei Jahr und etlich Monat ausgewesen, in welcher Zeit ich etliche 
unterschiedliche Meer überfahren, und vielerlei Völker gesehen, aber bei 
denenselben gemeiniglich mehr Böses als Gutes empfangen, von welchem 
allem ein großes Buch zu schreiben wäre; indessen war der teutsche Fried 
geschlossen worden […] ich aber setzte mich wider hinder die Bücher, 
welches dann beides meine Arbeit und Ergötzung war (562).   
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Simplicissimus’ adventures have shown him “mehr Böses als Gutes,” and his 
examination of three distopias and three utopias have given him fewer concrete answers 
to the political argument than he would have hoped for.  Of great interest to this study, 
Simplicissimus only mentions the “teutsche Fried” in passing.  His strikingly indifferent 
reaction to resolution of the central conflict of the novel, the Thirty Years’ War, 
emphasizes that the war itself is not the root of society’s ills, but rather the underlying 
absolutist system that leads to such wars.  Simplicissimus is ambivalent to the news and 
sets about reading to look for further answers to society’s ills without giving the end of 
the war any further thought.  Fittingly, the autodidact Simplicissimus reads about political 
science in his books directly after hearing about the “teutsche Fried:” 
 
Ich lase einsmals, wasmaßen das Oraculum Apollinis den römischen 
Abgesandten, als sie fragten was sie tun müßten, damit ihre Untertanen 
friedlich regiert würden, zur Antwort geben:  Nosce te ipsum, das ist, es 
sollte sich jeder selbst erkennen:  Solches machte daß ich mich 
hindersonne, und von mir selbst Rechnung über mein geführtes Leben 
begehrte, weil ich ohnedas müßig war (562).   
 
 
Simplicissimus has taken the oracle’s message to heart throughout his political inquiry, 
and his final decision to live the life of a hermit and begin the political argument anew 
shows his dedication to finding a just political system through his own means.  
Simplicissimus takes stock of his life and tells himself:  “Dein Leben ist kein Leben 
gewesen, sondern ein Tod” (562).  Simplicissimus finds the words he is looking for to 
describe his feelings in the work of Antonio de Guevara (1490-1545), an ascetic writer, 
whom Grimmelshausen quotes in the final chapter of Simplicissimus:  
 
Adjeu Welt, dann auf dich ist nicht zu trauen, noch von dir nichts zu 
hoffen, in deinem Haus ist das Vergangene schon verschwunden, das 
Gegenwärtige verschwindet uns unter den Händen, das Zukünftige hat nie 
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angefangen, das Allerbeständigste fällt, das Allerstärkste zerbricht, und 
das Allerewigste nimmt ein End; also, daß du ein Toter bist unter den 




Simplicissimus’ world, in war and in peace, has failed him.  He has searched for a just 
political system, and has not found one that could be mapped onto his native Germany.  
Simplicissimus responds by taking what he has learned from his investigation of the 
utopias and distopias that constitute the second half of the novel and applying it to the 
political argument.  His findings show that a complete restructuring of the political 
system from the definition of the state of nature, to the definition of the natural man, to 
the prescription of a just political must be revisited.  Simplicissimus accepts the charge of 
creating a just political system from the ground up.  Simplicissimus returns to the woods, 
where he is most insulated from the uncontrollable pressures of the world, to live as the 
first natural man of a just political system.  This man must be pious above all things to 
insure his afterlife.  Simplicissimus’ parting words to the reader are: 
 
Alle diese Wort [Antonio de Guevaras Schrift] erwog ich mit Fleiß und 
stetigem Nachdenken, und bewogen mich dermaßen, daß ich die Welt 
verließe, und wieder ein Einsiedel ward […] Begab mich derhalben in eine 
andere Wildnus, und fienge mein Spesserter Leben wieder an; ob ich aber 
wie mein Vatter sel. bis an mein End darin verharren werde, stehet dahin.  
Gott verleihe uns allen seine Gnade, daß wir allesamt dasjenige von ihm 
erlangen, woran uns am meisten gelegen, nämlich ein seliges Ende (571).   
 
 
For Simplicissimus to reach “ein seliges Ende,” he must leave the society he has 
examined and focus on himself as the first building block of a just society.  It can 
                                                
4 The “Anmerkungen” section from the Reclam edition of Simplicissimus cited in this paper explains 
Grimmelshausen’s source:  “Antonio de Guevara (um 1490-1545), Beichtvater Karls V., asketischer 
Schriftsteller. Das 24. Kap. hat Grimmelshausen fast wörtlich dessen ‘Menosprecio de corte y alabanza de 
aldea’ (1539) entnommen, und zwar der deutschen Übersetzung durch Aegidius Albertinus (ersch. 1599, in 
2. Aufl. 1601)” (766). 
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also be argued that Simplicissimus renews the political argument at this point, 
having reached a conclusion that living in a just way that will lead to eternal 
salvation can only be accomplished personally.  His renewed emphasis on his 
own life establishes a return to the definition of the natural man.  Coupled with his 
return to the woods, Simplicissimus begins the political argument anew with a 
revised definition of the state of nature and of natural man.  This is the revision of 
the political argument that anticipates Locke’s Second Treatise.   
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CHAPTER IV: GRIMMELSHAUSEN’S POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION AND 
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE NOVEL 
 
 
 The far-reaching role of political discourse in Simplicissimus brings new insights 
to the interpretation of the novel’s message and secondarily to the interpretation of the 
novel’s structure.  The six distopian and utopian worldviews that Simplicissimus explores 
are all located in the second half of the novel and are presented to the reader as three 
distopias (Jupiter, France, Oliver) followed by three utopias (Switzerland, Mummelsee, 
the life of a hermit).  These worldviews are spaced evenly throughout the second half of 
the novel and culminate in Simplicissimus’ return to the woods as a hermit.  
Simplicissimus’ structure has been the focus of considerable scholarly research, and this 
paper proposes a new structural interpretation of the novel’s composition based on the 
political argumentation in the text.  I propose that the first half of the novel constitutes 
Simplicissimus’ familiarization with the state of the German-speaking territories during 
the Thirty Years’ War, while the second half constitutes Simplicissimus’ search for a 
fitting answers to the political argument.  
 The debates concerning the novel’s structure have not previously examined the 
distopian-utopian structural principle.  Volker Meid summarizes the problem of 
interpreting of the novel’s form: 
 
Grimmelshausens Simplicissimus ist ein umfangreicher, vielschichtiger 
Roman, auf den verschiedene literarische Formen und Traditionen 
eingewirkt haben.  Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob sein Komplexität in 
einem überordneten Kompositionsprinzip aufgehoben und wie das 
Problem der epischen Intergration gelöst wird (Meid 140). 
 
 
The novel’s complexity invites multiple interpretations.  Simplicissimus is above all a 
picaresque novel and a satirical critique of society during the Thirty Years’ War in the 
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German-speaking territories, and many of the previous structural approaches to 
understanding the novel shed light on interesting aspects of the text.  Scholars have 
proposed frameworks in an attempt to interpret the novel’s underlying structure.  Meid 
states that the novel was also interpreted with the “Denkformen der Literatur der 
Goethezeit” and classified as a “Bildungs- bzw. Entwicklungsroman” (Meid 140).  Jan 
Hendrik Scholte interpreted the novel’s five books as following the fives acts of a 
classical drama in an inverted form (Meid 140).  Scholte writes:  “Die Gliederung der 
Handlung des Simplicissimus Teutsch in fünf Bücher verdient unsere Aufmerksamkeit.  
Der Psychologe Jung ist der Meinung, daß im fünfgliedrigen Bau des klassichen Dramas 
eine Urform alles menschlichen Träumens und Dichtens vorliegt.  Diese Ansicht könnte 
auch für den Simplicissimus Teutsch zutreffen” (Scholte 12).  Scholte complicates his 
structural interpretation by depicting two opposing curves, the “moralische-Kurve” and 
the “Erfolgskurve,” which follow Simplicissimus’ life and correlate his success in the 
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Figure 1.   
 
Scholte names the five books for the five acts in a classical drama with first chapter 
corresponding to the “Exposition,” the second to the “steigende Handlung,” and so forth.  
The peak of Simplicissimus’ success as a solider and thief, shown as the “Erfolgskurve,” 
occurs when he is the Jäger von Soest.  In an inverted reading, this period marks the 
corresponding depths of his morality, depicted in the “Moralische-kurve.”  
Another notable structural interpretation is Johannes Alt’s “Gesamtschema des 
Simplicissimus-Aufbaues” that shows “ein Strukturschema, das einen Lebensbogen mit 
Aufstieg und Fall nachzeichnet” (Meid 141).  Alt refers to the structure of the novel as 
“Typenaufbau:” “An diesem Schema können wir klar ablesen, daß Grimmelshausen 
seinen Roman bewußt nach einem bestimmten Typenaufbau geformt hat” (Alt 199).   
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Figure 2.  
 
Alt’s curve highlights the beginning and end of the novel as times in which 
Simplicissimus is a hermit and tracks his development over four phases:  “Narr-
Simplicissimus,” “Jäger von Soeßt,” “Galanter Abenteurer,” and “Olivier-Herzbruder” 
(Alt 203).  Through the use of these phases Alt argued that Simplicissimus could be 
classified as a “deutscher Entwicklungsroman” (Alt 204).   
Karl F. Otto explains the newest structural attempt applied to the novel:  “The 
latest, and perhaps the most controversial, theory has to do with a planetary structure.  
Both the American Germanist Helmut Rehder and the German academic Günther Weydt 
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proposed this theory more or less simultaneously.  Particularly important in this regard 
are the ‘Planeten-kindschafts-Bilder,’ a series of woodcuts illustrating each of the known 
planets and a number of characteristics of each as well” (Otto 7).  According to Weydt 
and Rehder, the novel’s composition is divided into “Planetenphasen […] Saturn, Mars, 
Sonne, Jupiter, Venus, Merkur, Mond” (Meid 146).  While no single interpretation of the 
novel’s structural underpinnings can encompass the novel’s full complexity, but 
structural investigations can shed light on trends in the novel. 
 I propose a new structural interpretation of the text in light of the novel’s political 
argumentation.  Like Alt’s diagram, the political structure begins and ends with 
Simplicissimus’ life as a hermit.  Like Scholte’s diagram, the midpoint occurs when 
Simplicissimus is the Jäger von Soest.  Simplicissimus learns about the German-speaking 
territories during the Thirty Years’ War during the first half of the novel.  During this 
period Simplicissimus spends time with soldiers from all around Europe and persons 
from all walks of life.  These characters do not present alternative political worldviews, 
but rather constitute the world of the German-speaking territories during the Thirty 
Years’ War.  They are the actors in Simplicissimus’ vision of society as a tree that he 
pictures in a dream very early in the novel: 
 
In solchen Gedanken entschlief ich […] da dünkte mich, gleichwie in 
einem Traum, als wenn sich alle Bäum, die um meine Wohnung stunden, 
gähling veränderten, und ein ganz ander Ansehen gewönnen; auf jedem 
Gipfel saße ein Cavallier, und all Äst wurden anstatt der Blätter mit 
allerhand Kerlen geziert; von solchen hatten etliche lange Spieß, andere 
Musketen, kurze Gewehr, Partisanen, Fähnlein, auch Trommel und 
Pfeifen.  Dies war lustig anzusehen, weil alles so ordentlich und fein grad 
weis sich auseinander teilete; die Wurzel aber war von ungültigen Leuten, 
als Handwerkern, Taglöhnern, mehrenteils Bauren und dergleichen, 
welche nichtsdestoweniger dem Baum seine Kraft verliehen und wieder 
von neuem mitteilten, wann er solche zuzeiten verlor (59). 
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The tree shows the hierarchy of society and the difficulty of those members in the lower 
ranks to rise up within it.  The struggle in this tree is mirrored in the society that 
Simplicissimus encounters in the first half of the novel.  Absolutism is the dominant 
political system and throughout the first half of the novel Simplicissimus acquaints 
himself with all of problems under this system that prevents the farmers and workers 
from rising in society.  Simplicissimus thrives in this system and rises to the top through 
his deeds as a soldier and his trickster alter ego the Jäger von Soest.   
 As the Jäger von Soest, Simplicissimus steals and robs his way to fortune and 
fame.  Scholte indicates in his diagram that the nadir of Simplicissimus’ moral 
development is as the Jäger von Soest.  Simplicissimus himself admits that during this 
time he is farthest from the moral teachings of the hermit:  “Darbei fieng ich an, nach und 
nach mit Fressen und Saufen ein epikurisch Leben zu führen, weil ich meines Einsiedlers 
Lehr vergessen [habe]” (253).   Simplicissimus decides to right his ways after this 
episode:  “[ich] stellte mein vorig gottlos Leben allerdings ab und beflisse mich allein der 
Tugend und Frömmigkeit” (259).  Immediately after reaching both the height of his 
fortune and the nadir of his morals, Simplicissimus decides to change his ways.  Directly 
after this decision he meets Jupiter, who is followed by the other distopias and utopias, 
which lead him back to the life of a hermit.  Simplicissimus’ pinnacle in the society of the 
Thirty Years’ War corresponds to his rejection of it and the beginning of his search for 
alternative models to the absolutist political system.   
 The following diagram elaborates the interpretation of the political argumentation 
in Simplicissimus.   
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 This diagram depicts Simplicissimus’ departure from, and return to, the hermit’s 
life.  After leaving the woods and the hermit’s life, Simplicissimus familiarizes himself 
with the society of the Thirty Years’ War and becomes successful within this society.  As 
Scholte also points out, Simplicissimus reaches the height of his success as the Jäger von 
Soest.  This is the turning point for him, after which he tries to lead a better life. To 
Scholte this turning point also corresponds to Simplicissimus’ moral nadir.  I propose that 
precisely at this point Simplicissimus recognizes that his success in society has come at 
the cost of his morality, and in light of the hermit’s teachings decides that he will change 
his life.  At this moment he realizes the truth of the broken society that caused his lowest 
moral point and begins to search for alternatives to the absolutist system.  The second 
half of the novel corresponds to the distopian and utopian worldviews Simplicissimus 
examines to establish an alternative system of government.  The search culminates in a 
return to the hermit’s life.    
 
S. as the Jäger von Soest 
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CHAPTER V: THE POLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
FRONTISPIECES 
 
 The famous copper frontispiece from the first edition of Simplicissimus has been 
the topic of much research in the last century, due to its numerous details and 
multifaceted layout.  Sibylle Penkert explains: “Die Frage nach der Bedeutung der 
Grimmelshausen-Titelkupfer und besonders das Problem des sogenannten Phönix-
Chimären-Kupfers ist als konsequenter Untersuchungsansatz keineswegs so alt wie die 
Grimmelshausenforschung” (Penkert 257).  Recent scholarship maintains that the 
frontispiece is an integral part of the novel and necessary for understanding the text.  
Shannon Keenan Greene demonstrates that Grimmelshausen wants his readers to 
approach the text and frontispiece simultaneously:    
 
Grimmelshausen, as he writes about reading, seeing, drawing, letters, 
alphabets, and writing in Simplicissimus, sets up an analytical framework 
that can itself be applied to reading the Grimmelshausen book corpus.  In a 
very concrete sense, the Grimmelshausen corpus consists of books that 
contain both words and pictures—illustrations—that express the events 
and meaning of the stories.  Because Grimmelshausen himself invites a 
reading that is also a viewing, it is fruitful to apply this analytic 
framework, his own, in a reading of his, Grimmelshausen’s, texts in 
conjunction with their illustrations (Greene 334).   
 
 
Greene is not alone in her approach to interpreting the novel with the frontispiece: 
“Within Grimmelshausen scholarship, scholars such as Sibylle Penkert, Alan Menhennet, 
Jeffrey Ashcroft, and others have proposed emblematic models for understanding the 
Grimmelshausen illustrations in conjunction with their texts, and conversely, for 
understanding the Grimmelshausen texts in conjunction with their illustrations” (337).  
Greene points out that Simplicissimus himself reads the pictures and the words of an  
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Figure 4.  
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illustrated bible while living with the hermit and experiences “a visual engagement with 
books” (Greene 334).  Simplicissimus tries at first to speak directly to the book’s 
pictures: “ich fragte dieselbige Bilder seltsame Sachen, weil mir aber kein Antwort 
widerfahren wollte, wurde ich ungedultig” (43).  The hermit must explain to 
Simplicissimus that the letters complement the pictures: “diese Bilder können nicht reden 
was aber ihr Tun und Wesen sey kann ich auß diesen schwartzen Linien sehen welches 
man lesen nennet” (43).  Greene explains:  “From these black lines of print, he explains, 
thereby lending color and shape to the words on the page, one sees the actions and 
essence of the pictures” (Greene 333).  Owing to the strong association between reading 
and illustrations in the text, it has been speculated that Grimmelshausen himself drew or 
designed the frontispiece.   
 Greene summarizes the opinions in the research on the authorship of the 
frontispiece:  “Jörg Jochen Berns considers it most likely that Grimmelshausen was the 
‘Inventor seiner Titelgraphiken’ (Berns 1988, 315), and Menhennet calls the Phoenix 
illustration ‘in all probability [Grimmelshausen’s] own work’ (Menhennet 1995, 278) 
(Greene 344).  Greene herself believes that “[t]he amateur quality itself points to 
Grimmelshausen as the artist” (Greene 344).  It cannot be proven that Grimmelshausen is 
the author of the frontispiece, but it most probable that he designed it to compliment the 
novel and should be interpreted with the text.   
 Much research has focused on identifying the odd hybrid character in the 
frontispiece.  Generally the frontispiece is referred to as the “Phoenix copperplate,” 
however, not all scholars identify the figure as a phoenix.  Greene summarizes: 
 
Of the chief interpretations of this figure, a prevalent strain makes 
reference to the composite monster in Horaces’s Ars poetic.  Karl-Heinz 
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Habersetzer cites passages from Vogelnest I as well as Ratio Status and the 
Satyrischer Pilgram (76-77) to demonstrate that Grimmelshausen was 
intimately familiar with Horace’s Ars poetica text.  In the Ars poetica, a 
creature composed of mixed parts is summoned as an exemplum of an 
unpleasant image.  The Horatian creature has a man’s head, feathers, a 
fish’s lower body, a woman’s breasts, and so on; that is to say, it is 
consistent with Grimmelshausen’s Phoenix design (Greene 345-346). 
 
 
Beyond the Horatian hybrid, different scholars have identified the figure as other 
creatures:  “Schade (1987) asserts that there exists an iconography of the picaresque.  By 
this he means a composition comprised of disparate parts;” “Fritz Halfter in 1924, 
Hellmut Rosenfeld in 1935, and Walter Ernst Schäfer in 1972 saw, in the Phoenix, horns, 
ears, hand gesture, and “feet” a satyr figure, and connected the satyr beast to satirical 
texts;” and “Berns concludes that a satirical and satyresque Über-Ich, a superego, 
embodied in the Phoenix image, controls the whole cycle in a play of onstage masking 
and de-masking that ultimately points to Grimmelshausen himself (316-17)” (Greene 
346-347).  Despite these multiple attempts to identify the figure on the frontispiece, 
scholarship has reached no consensus interpretation. 
 The frontispiece can be analyzed by approaching its three distinct parts as an 
emblem.  The emblematic character of the frontispiece was first proposed by Albrecht 
Schöne: “Schöne asserts that an illustrated text is like an emblem:  the subscriptio, or 
text, explicates the pictura, that is, the frontispiece” (Greene 337).  The first edition 
frontispiece also includes an inscriptio:  “Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch.” 
Taken together these three parts contain a message relevant for the political interpretation 
of the novel.   
  The political argumentation in the text suggest another possible interpretation of 
the frontispiece.  I identify the figure in the frontispiece as Simplicissimus himself.  The 
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inscriptio reads “Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch” and therefore, I argue, 
signifies the figure, regardless of form or hybridity, as the protagonist of the novel.  
Throughout the novel Simplicissimus travels effortlessly through the earth.  He flies in 
the company of witches, swims in the company of the mermen in the Mummelsee, travels 
great distances over land, and even survives fire.  His ability to traverse these 
environments may explain the figure’s bird, fish, and hoofed mammalian hybridity.  
However, the figure’s form is of less importance than its identity as Simplicissimus, its 
actions, and the pictura’s relationship to the subscriptio.   
 In the frontispiece Simplicissimus holds a book and to which he points.  This 
book can be understood to be the novel Simplicissimus, and hence the figure’s 
autobiography in novel form.  In the text, Simplicissimus mentions writing down his 
story after returning to the Black Forest and soon thereafter to a hermit’s life (562). 
The book of his life is also mentioned in the subscriptio of the frontispiece:   
 
 
Ich wurde durchs Fewer wie Phoenix geborn.  
Ich flog duch die Lüffte, wurd doch nit verlorn.   
Ich wandert durchs Wasser, raißt über Landt,  
in solchem Umbschwermen macht ich mir bekandt,   
was mich offt betrüebet und selten ergetzt,  
was war das?  Ich habs in diß Buche gesetzt   
damit sich der Leser gleich wie ich izt thue,   
entferne der Thorheit und lebe in Rhue (6). 
 
 
Reading the inscriptio to identify the figure as Simplicissimus and the book to which he 
is referring as the novel Simplicissimus, and the novel (“diß Buche”) in the subscriptio as 
a tool for the reader to “entferne der Thorheit und lebe in Rhue,” then the novel has an 
analogous aim to that of the political argument.  If by reading this novel the reader may 
personally be delivered from having to live through the horrible experiences that form 
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Simplicissimus’ existence and is left in peace, then Grimmelshausen has achieved what 
he could not achieve through political argumentation, providing peace to others.  
Shannon Keenan Greene’s study on the performative of the frontispiece supports this 
argument: 
 
As I have argued in my dissertation (18), seventeenth-century book 
illustrations, particularly book frontispieces, are performative in a number 
of senses: a performative of promise (a promise as to what topic the book 
will treat), a performance in the sense of an advertisement (the frontispiece 
will to some extent determine a book’s representation in the marketplace), 




According to Greene, the frontispiece presents “a promise as to what topic the book will 
treat” (Greene 339).  In this case, the novel’s frontispiece promises to relate 
Simplicissimus’ story with all of his adventures and his political findings, to the readers, 
who, hopefully, will not have to experience these events themselves.  In this manner, 
Grimmelshausen advances the goal of the political philosopher to bring peace and 
security to the world.  The political philosopher suggests a just form of government in 
order to establish peace for an entire society.  Grimmelshausen does not have a just 
political system to advocate, instead he offers a novel that may bring peace to his readers 
one at a time. 
The novel ends with Simplicissimus returning to the state of nature and focusing 
on his own life and eternal salvation.  The emphasis on the Self restarts the definition of 
natural man, of the individual.  The frontispiece attests that Grimmelshausen seeks to 
bring his individual reader to peace, thereby echoing the emphasis on the natural man, 
and hence, the individual.  Society has failed Simplicissimus, and Grimmelshausen 
suggests that it has failed his readers as well, as they need to be set in “Rhue.”  Instead of 
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attempting to create a just society to bring about peace for the multitudes, 
Grimmelshausen uses his poetic skill to bring about peace for the individual reader.  The 
single figure on the frontispiece reflects the novel’s emphasis on the individual.   
Grimmelshausen’s focus on the single person, the lone individual, constitutes a 
clear break from the political philosophy of Hobbes.  A comparison of the frontispiece of 
Grimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus and Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) illustrates the shift in 
emphasis from the many to the individual in a compelling manner.  The Phoenix figure in 
the Simplicissimus frontispiece is an individual composed of animal appendages that 
evoke the figure’s ability to traverse all earthly environments.  The towering figure on the 
Leviathan frontispiece is composed of many individuals whose power increases when 
joined in civil harmony.  The Simplicissimus figure holds a copy of the novel that 
conveys Grimmelshausen’s individualized political philosophy.  The crowned Leviathan 
figure holds a sword and scepter, symbolizing the centralized control of army and 
religious institutions.  Symbols of society that adorn the bottom half of the Leviathan 
frontispiece, such as the canon, tower, and crown, are also present in the figure’s book on 
the title engravings of Simplicissimus.  The presence of these exact same societal symbols 
in the picaresque autobiographical novel reveals that the elements of the political treatise 
are literally mapped onto this fictional work.   
Grimmelshausen, however, breaks with Hobbes’ defense of absolutism and 
revisits the three parts of the political argument.  His political findings shift his emphasis 
to the first two parts of the political argument, the state of nature and the natural man.  
The focus on the individual is physically presented in the single figure in the 
Simplicissimus frontispiece and the textual emphasis Grimmelshausen places on the 
individual reader’s “Rhue.” Taken together with the text, the Simplicissimus frontispiece 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Building on Dieter Breuer’s article “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation: 
Sein Verhältnis zur absolutistischen Staatsauffassung,” this thesis presents 
Grimmelshausen’s substantial political argumentation in his novel Der abenteurerliche 
Simplicissimus Teutsch (1668) and its relationship to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) 
and John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1689).  Through a narrow focus on the 
political aspects of the novel, my research reveals previously unnoticed ramifications of 
the political arguments in the text on its interpretation.  First, mapping the three-part 
political argument of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onto the novel confirms 
that Grimmelshausen’s insights goes beyond a simple rejection of Hobbesian absolutism 
and anticipates Locke’s political philosophy.  Grimmelshausen’s anticipation of Locke’s 
groundbreaking work shows him to be a remarkable political thinker.  Second, political 
argumentation plays a far-reaching role in the novel, not only building Grimmelshausen’s 
political advocation of leaving society for the solitary hermit’s life, but also reshaping the 
structure of the text.  The political argumentation uncovers a structure of the novel in 
which the protagonist spends the first half of the novel familiarizing himself with the 
treacherous society of the Thirty Years’ War and the second half looking for alternative 
political models presented in a series of distopian and utopian worldviews.  Finally, the 
novel’s political reasoning and Grimmelshausen’s rejection of Hobbes are reflected in the 
novel’s frontispiece.  The Simplicissimus frontispiece shows a single hybrid creature that 
emphasizes Grimmelshausen’s focus on the individual and rejection of society that 
sharply contrasts to Hobbes’ frontispiece that emphasizes the absolute power of a 
Leviathan composed of citizens.  The new interpretation of the Simplicissimus 
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frontispiece reveals that Grimmelshausen’s goal throughout the novel is analogous to that 
of a political philosopher: to bring peace to humankind.  A novel and political treatise in 
one, Grimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus deserves recognition as a bridge between Hobbes’ 
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